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FOREWORD 
The paper by Joyce Nakahara and Ronald Witton in this num­
ber of the Southeast Asia Data Papers reflects, on the one hand, 
the detailed knowledge that is the hallmark of the best area 
studies and, on the other, the rigorous empirical testing of a 
particular theory of social change that is the particular empha­
sis of comparative studies. Thus, the paper represents· an 
intersection of these styles of work that results in a kind of 
intellectual "hybrid vigor." 
As it happens, this paper derives from a particular theory
of social change that was generated in the course of my work on 
intervillage systems and community differentiation. Since the 
theory is not widely known, and the paper assumes a fairly de­
tailed knowledge of it, a brief introduction seems in order. 
This particular theory of social change has been labeled "struc­
tural-symbolic" because it deals with whole structures, such as 
communities or nations, and because its starting assumption is 
that all the phenomena of culture and society may be construed 
as patterns of social symbols. ·The key variables are all de­
fined in terms of formal characteristics of social symbols. 
Differentiation is the diversity of social symbols maintained 
by a social system, while solidarity is the degree of "focus" 
that such symbols manifest. The third variable is relative 
centrality, defined as the degree to which symbols maintained 
by subsystems are incorporated into the symbolic structure of 
the system. 
Social symbols are those sign-vehicles, be they words, 
behavior, or artifact, that convey meaning. The usage here is 
closer to the meaning of "culture" .than it is to the somewhat 
rarified interpretation of symbolism ·current in studies of myth 
or religion. In other words, virtually every aspect of human 
activity is symbolic in this sense. The only proviso is that 
the activity represent the system level under study. Thus, a 
Thanksgiving dinner is the patterned activity of the family
unit, while a community picnic is a datum appropriate to the 
study of the community. 
Structural-symbolic theory takes the idea of system levels 
quite seriously for two reasons. First, the theory purports to 
hold for any system level, from family to nation. Second, and 
more important for the dynamics of the hypotheses, the theory 
is phrased as an interplay between system and subsystem and, in 
general, certain patterns of symbolic activity at the subsystem
level are thought to lead to changes in the structure of the 
system. Thus, "subcommttnities" (i.e.e, neighborhoods, barrios, 
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etc.) are subsystems of communities, and these in turn are inter­
preted as constituent units of intercommunity systems, and so 
on. Admittedly, the system-subsystem postulate is a simplifica­
tion. Not all the activity of subsystems occurs under the aus­
pices of the containing system and in many cases, such as the 
intervillage structure of isolated New Guinea tribes, or the 
weak national structure of early Italy or France, it is diffi­
cult to argue that the system really exists. On the other hand,
it is impossible to do theory without making simplifying assump­
tions, and this one seems to hold widely enough--and the excep­
tions are manageable--to justify its use. 
The third assumption has to do with "what makes things go." 
It is assumed that a social system, that is, a symbolic struc­
ture in the terms of the theory, will attempt to reduce any
"communication discrepancy" by developing an alternative com­
munication strategy. In explication of this assumption, one 
notes first that it is anti-reductionist. It says in effect 
that changes in families, communities, intervillage systems,
etc., can be understood without recourse to individual-level 
variables such as values, frustrations, or needs. The assump­
tion also denies the usual "motivation" postulate of those 
social theories that turn on the maximization principle. In 
this theory communities are not attempting to maximize anything, 
even their symbolic structure. More specifically, it denies 
that communities attempt to maximize control over resources,
satisfaction of the individual members, or, more generally, the 
amount of gross energy processed by the system. It is not 
denied that communities may do all these things, and that much 
community rhetoric is oriented to such goals, but their.rele­
vance to this particular theory of social change is nil. 
Perhaps the fundamental aspect of the motivation postulate
is that system activity can be interpreted as a composite of 
communication strategies. Actually, this is simply another way
of talking about social systems as symbolic structures, because 
the variables of the theory--differentiation, solidarity, and 
relative centrality--amount to dimensions of communication. As 
defined above, they are formal dimensions of the social symbols
maintained by the system, but symbolic implies communication, 
so the variables are also dimensions of communication. All this 
is taken as true by definition, but it is important to be expli­
cit about it, because when the theory is actually used one must 
keep in mind that the variables are both dimensions of structure 
and ongoing communication. Thus, the motivation postulate says
that a discrepancy between two dimensions of symbolic structure 
tends to result in changes in other such communication patterns.
In particular, the ratio of high differentiation to low relative 
centrality is hypothesized to lead to increased solidarity, as 
will be discussed in detail below. 
• 
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The main problem that the theory deals with, although it 
is not the only one, is why some systems differentiate structur­
ally while others do not. Empirical research on this problem 
requires the study of a sample of systems, such as all the vil­
lages in a particular region, at two points in time. A tech­
nique called the "macrosurvey" has been worked out for collect­
ing the requisite data, and an analysis format is also available. 
Briefly, information is collected by interviewing one informant 
in each place. Since the object of the research is to construct 
variables that reflect the symbolic organization of the whole 
community, the interviewer asks questions such as whether or 
not there is a primary school, a hardware store, a doctor, etc. , 
in the community and whether or not these existed, say, 15 years 
ago. It is assumed that the presence of such institutionalized 
patterns reflects, in· this case, increasing d1versity of the 
symbolic structure, that is, differentiation of the community. 
Similar questions get at the degree of "coherence" of such 
institutions, and whether or not the community as a whole is 
recognized in the symbolic structure of the system. This is 
the technique that has. been used in most of the research done 
so far. However, inasmuch as the object of data collection is 
to develop structural variables--dimensions of the system as a 
system in contrast to aggregations of subunits that must be 
assumed to stand for system properties--it is equally feasible 
to use certain kinds of documentary data. Thus, Nakahara and 
Witton use available data on the varieties of banks in Thai 
provinces as the basis of one of their differentiation scales. 
Briefly stated, the theory attempts to explain increases 
in the differentiation of subsystems--provin�es in the Thai 
case--as the result of a shift in their position in the total 
communication structure. Such a change in the subsystem's com­
munication niche, that is, a shift in its relative centrality,
is brought about by a solidarity movement. Under certain condi­
tions of structural discrepancy, as specified by the first 
hypothesis given below, the symbolic structure of a subcommunity
"turns in on its elf," and develops a high degree of focus· or 
coherence. Such solidarity can be considered the trigger for 
change which may, under certain conditions, result �nean increase 
in the differentiation level of the subsystem. The variable 
that conditions whether the solidarity-relative centrality­
increased differen�iation sequence will actually run its course 
is the degree of centrality--the "comprehensiveness"--of the 
system's symbolic structure. If the intervillage system's 
structure has loose integration at the beginning of ·the sequence 
but then increases it as the process moves on, subsystem differ­
entiation comes about. 
The hypothesis that bears on the Nakahara-Witten paper may 
be stated as follows: 1. An increase in this differentiation­
relative centrality ratio will lead to an increase in subsystem
solidarity. 
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This hypothesis is based on the previously stated assump­
tion that subsystems tend to develop alternative communication 
strategies when they are caught in a communications discrepancy.
The particular discrepancy stated in hypothesis 1 is the situa­
tion where the subsystem's level of differentiation is high 
relative to the system's capacity to recognize and incorporate 
the subsystem's symbols. More crudely stated, the subsystem 
has more organizational capacity than it has access to the in­
formation in the larger structure. The communication leaders,
that is, the incumbents of the various institutionalized roles 
of the community, recognize this disturbing situation and begin 
to communicate with each other in an attempt to make sense out 
of their predicament. Such internal intercommunication leads to 
the creation of "transformation codes" by which the members of 
the differentiated sectors of the community can understand each 
other. Various slogans, interpretations and policies are agreed 
upon, and various bridging symbols, sometimes in the person of 
a leader or a representative group, are found. But such sym­
bolic bridging is what is meant by "symbolic focus," because in 
this manner the available social symbols are, so to speak, bent 
toward each other and a coherent definition of the situation is 
presented. Such a solidarity structure is inherently dramatic, 
in that the process of achieving a symbolic focus requires the 
heavy use of contrast and other modes of dramatization. The 
virtues of the in-group are opposed to·ethe vices of the out­
group and, as the ideology is elaborated, the contrast between 
good and evil, dark and light, etc., is more pronounced. Simi­
larly, such dramatization involves the use of novel symbols or 
combines old symbols in new ways. A wide range of stratagems 
is used to call attention to the subgroup and to its stated 
plight. 
The effect of such increasing solidarity is to force the 
communication leaders of the system to pay attention to the sub­
system and, in at least a minimal, often a pejorative way, to 
find ways to think about it. At first, they may consider the 
actions of the subsystem as an annoyance or as a threat, but as 
the symbolic work goes on, the social symbols of the subsystem 
are gradually taken into account, at least in a temporary way.
In this manner, an increase in subsystem relative centrality is 
achieved, and the degree of solidarity begins to decline. How­
ever, if at the same time the system develops a greater capacity 
to incorporate subsystem symbols apart from those that it is 
forced to deal with because of a solidarity thrust from below, 
then the new level of relative centrality achieved by the sub­
system may be stabilized. But now a different kind of symbolic 
work occurs, in that the symbolic structure of the system begins 
to impinge upon the various symbols that were proposed by the 
subsystem. If, for instance, a religious sect has achieved a 
new communication niche in a community, then it becomes subject
to the various pressures of the community and must develop a 
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means to accommodate them. A process of internal differentia­
tion takes place, so that the diverse pressures can be dealt 
with more effectively. The sect may develop definite membership
criteria, organize a Sunday school and begin using a more stan­
dardized format in its sermons. By now it may legitimately be 
called a "denomination,e" with an implied higher level of differ­
entiation in its social organization, which, in the terms of 
this theory, is taken as direct evidence of an increased com­
plexity of its symbolic structure. 
Although the question is not handled by the theory, it is 
of interest to ask how a subsystem could develop a high level 
of differentiation relative to its centrality level in the first 
place. There are two ways, which on close scrutiny amount to 
the same thing. A group may develop a certain level of differ­
entiation in one region or country and then migrate to another 
and end up with a low level of relative centrality in the new 
situation. The many and at least partly educated ethnic groups
that came to American shores only to become isolated or marginal
subcommunities in large cities are a ready example. The other 
mechanism that brings about a high differentiation-relative 
centrality ratio is that a particular group may achieve aecer­
tain level of differentiation as a member of a particular region 
but then the regional boundaries shift so that it is incleuded 
in a new region but with a loss of centrality. Instead of 
migration of the subgroup as above, one has migration of region­
al boundaries, and the outcome is identical in both cases. 
Something of a mix of these two processes occurs in the new 
nations as frontiers are fixed for the first time (usually by 
colonial powers) and "free-fleoating" peripheral states and 
regions find themselves "locked"- into systems. This is par­
ticularly relevant for nations such as Thailand where the tradi­
tional state had been defined by its· center rather than its 
frontiers. In Thailand's case it was the activities by the 
colonial powers around it that determined which peripheral areas 
would be included in, and excluded from, the nation of Thailand. 
The foregoing highly condensed statement is something of a 
revision of an earlier position that was contained in an article 
entitled "A Proposal for Cooperative Cross-Culetural Research on 
Intervillage Systems" (Young, 1966). The more recent version 
is presented in greater detail in "Reactive Subsystems" (1970)
although that statement confines itself for the most part to 
hypothesis 1. Various measurement problems are discussed and 
illustrated in "Differentiation and Solidarity in Fifty Agricul­
tural Communities" (Young, Spencer, Flora, 1968) and in a number 
of theses of which the most representative are those of Spencer
(1967) and Weldon (1968), both of which deal with Latin American 
communities. For Southeast Asia, an important source that is 
directly relevant to the Thailand study is Witton's (1969) 
article on the development of cities in Java. Here the basic 
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technique of scaling institutional differences such as hospitals 
or schools as a measure of differentiation and computing change 
over time is vividly illustrated. The technique worked out in 
that paper is carried over to the Thai data and combined with 
another approach, based on a unique handling of census cate­
gories, that Nakahara developed. 
In more general terms, the intellectual antecedents of 
this particular approach to social change may be traced from 
Durkheim through Redfield and thence to the more recent expo­
nents of "Chicago sociology" such as Burke and Goffman. It is 
probably fair to say, however, that the particular methodologi­
cal emphasis on structural variables results from an exposure
to the techniques of sociological measurement. Many of these 
ideas, and certainly the climate of opinion, were generated at 
Cornell when the anthropology faculty was joint with that of 
sociology, and then the comparative study of social change was 
a dominant concern. To a great extent, although it may not 
appear so to persons not intimately acquainted with the early 
Cornell style in anthropology, the approach to the study of 
interrelated systems as well as the theory sketched above is 
"second generation" Cornell. 
With the help of the theoretical sketch given above, it is 
possible to summarize what this paper by Nakahara and Witton 
attempts to do. At the same time, the somewhat abstract charac­
terization of structural-symbolic theory given above can be made 
more concrete and understandable. The first part of the Naka­
hara-Witton paper is an exercise in structural measurement. 
The paper stresses the utility of Guttman scaling as a means of 
constructing a measure of differentiation, because it permits 
them to use such qualitative data as the presence or absence of 
institutions such as.banks, hotels, newspapers, Young Buddhist 
Associations and all the variants of these. Also, it is possi­
ble to use the categories for occupations in the census. In 
the latter case, the question is not how many metal workers,
tool makers, or chemists there are in each province, but whether 
there is at least one. At least one incumbent of the occupa­
tional role is required, but after that the real emphasis is on 
the presence or absence of a cultural category. Indeed, it is 
probably true that the census office, representing as it does 
the central government, has as much to do with the appearance
of an occupational category as does the empirical fact of a 
practitioner in that occupation. 
Thus, in addition to the particular technique of Guttman 
scaling another aspect of measurement emerges. From the point 
of view of the theory, the most important aspect of these 
measures of differentiation is that concrete institutional pat­
terns are interpreted as reflecting increasing complexity of 
the symbolic structure. It will be recalled that the fundamental 
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starting point of the theory is that all sociocultural facts 
may be interpreted as symbolic. In line with this assumption,
the differentiation scales that are built out of occupational 
categories or institutional patterns such as banks are inter­
preted as measuring· the degree of differentiation of the cul­
tural world. 
When one works with the public and stabilized cultural 
categories that structural measurement requires, there is a 
good chance that some record is available of the state of those 
categories at an earlier point in time. Social systems must 
keep track of themselves in this way. Indeed a part of what 
one means by social system is an organization that produces 
data about itself. .  Exploiting this characteristic of structural 
attributes, Nakahara and Witton were able to construct differen­
tiation measures for several points in time, spanning some 19 
years. In short, they have measured the rate of structural 
change for Thai provinces and, more generally, their technique 
illustrates how the rate of change of structural differentiation 
may be measured for any social system that is large enough to 
generate data about itself. 
The significance of this approac_h to the measurement of 
change is that it gives a direct measure of structure which is 
what most theories of social change talk about. The many tech­
nical problems of aggregate measures are avoided, but most of 
all structural measures bypass the fatal assumption required by 
aggregate measures that the measures of central tendency that 
are typically used may stand for the state of the system. Thus,
the holistic study of culture need not continue to be restricted 
to impressionistic case studies; a technique of measurement is 
now available that gives sufficient precision for quantitative 
studies without sacrificing any essential element of the holis­
tic perspective. In addition, with a structural understanding
of the system as a whole, any subsequent case studies will be 
of much greater value. 
It requires no great imagination to think of many important 
uses for a measure of structural differentiation for Thai prov­
inces, but the particular use that Nakahara and Witton put it 
to is nothing short of daring. They first note that there 
exists crude but usable information on guerrilla activity in 
the provinces. Such information they trichotomize into "no 
guerrilla activity reported," "guerrilla activity reported" and 
"a military officer is in charge of combating the guerrillas.e" 
With such broad categories, they eliminate many problems of un­
reliability typical of such information. However, even if the 
data were unreliable, one would have to show that a particular
bias existed in the reporting that affected their conclusions. 
The general effect of randomized error is to preclude any result 
at all. 
. 
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But what does such guerrilla activity mean theoretically?
From the point of view of the theory, the mobilization of effort 
and ideas that is represented by such activity is an indicator 
of solidarity. Thus, Nakahara and Witton are in a position to 
test hypothesis 1 if they can make one other assumption which, 
as it happens, turns out to be eminently reasonable. They 
assume that the high degree of "primacy" in Thailand, that is, 
the great gap between Bangkok and all the rest of the country­
side, may be construed as evidence of low relative centrality
for the hinterland provinces. If this is so, then any advance 
in differentiation on the part of such peripheral provinces 
would bring about the high differentiation-relative centrality
ratio that, according to hypothesis 1 leads to solidarity. The 
test of this hypothesis is summarized in the tables in the 
latter part of the paper; suffice to say that their relation­
ships are very strong indeed. 
A consideration of the implications of structural-symbolic 
theory that emerge in this paper brings us full circle to the 
new trend in area studies mentioned at the outset. One of the 
fundamental purposes for the holistic training given area 
specialists is to equip them to direct, or at least advise on 
problems of change in developing countries. The assumption is 
that broad and detailed knowledge of an area helps both in pro­
posing change programs and in avoiding the many pitfalls of 
such work. Certainly this position is well taken, but it seems 
even more true that if the area specialist has available some 
generalizations and perhaps a general theory of change, his 
position is even stronger. Such theory helps him to see empiri­
cal patterns that he might miss despite detailed knowledge of a 
country, and it also suggests many new change strategies. In 
short, area specialization in conjunction with comparative
generalization is clearly a more adequate starting point than 
either one alone. The paper by Nakahara and Witton illustrates 
the new stance, and is an important step on the way to its 
realization. 
Frank W. Young 
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INTRODUCTION 
Studies of the process of development in countries of the 
Third World have utilized a variety-of approaches, each with 
its own particular advantages and disadvantages, and in this 
regard studies of Thailand have been no exception. There are 
the national level studies, typically carried out by etonomists, 
which attempt to apply the often overly-sophisticated tech­
niques of economic analysis, developed in the West, to the some­
times suspect and often crude data produced by the social 
accounting mechanisms of these developing nations. That these 
statistics are often suspect is not denied by those who produce
them and even when they are reliable, their descriptive capaci­
ties may be called into question: for example, what does it 
mean to say that Kuwait now has the highest per capita income 
of any nation in the world if that income is derived from oil 
wells belonging solely to the sheik? or that Thailand has a 
certain number of doctors per 1,000 people if a highly dispro­
portionate number of doctors lives in Bangkok and serves the 
elite? 
A second approach is to confine oneself to regional analy­
sis. (See, for example, Keyes, 1967a. )  The region can be a 
very effective unit for analysis, especially for those nations 
where disparate geographical, political or ethnic groupings
have been consolidated through the colonial process into a 
"nation." However, there is a general lack of regional-level
data available, forcing one then to rely on impressionistic
analysis. Below the regional level, whether the unit be the 
province, tribe, district or village, one encounters even more 
problems in collecting data, due either to the lack of such 
data or to doubts as to their reliability; this is especially 
true of data amenable to comparative study. These areas of 
analysis then become pre-eminently the domain of the case study.
(See for example such studies as Sharp et al, 1953; and Keyes,
1967b. ) While the case study allows much detail and insight 
one wonders whether the province, town or village chosen is 
representative of other units in the vicinity, how it compares 
with units elsewhere in the nation and how selectively the data 
1were collected--either consciously or unconsciously.e In 
1. · Moreover, the general lack of suitable samplinge. procedures 
and standardized theoretical frameworks render the case 
study unsuitable to a cumulative growth in knowledge and 
hence there arises a proliferation of case studies that bear 
little relationship or comparability to one another. For a 
discussion of this see Carol Owen (1969: chapter 2). 
1 
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addition, the cost in time and money of carrying out such 
studies prohibits any random sampling that would allow one to 
make valid inferences to villages or provinces in general. 
This paper, in an exploratory way, will attempt to apply a 
new approach to this problem and will attempt to overcome some 
of the above difficulties. Its immediate theoretical and 
methodological roots are in the work carried out by Frank W. 
Young and the Cornell Comparative Modernization Research Methods 
Project. The study will examine the sixty-nine2 provinces of 
Thailand, and will .examine the nature and correlates of develop­
ment at this level, development being seen as a process of 
structural differentiation. In addition, the question of rates 
of development will be investigated with particular regard to 
regionalism and internal conflict which are rapidly becoming a 
major concern in Thailand. 
The study itself has substantive, theoretical and methodo­
logical implications. Substantively, as studies such as this 
become more sophisticated and common, there will be a greater
understanding of the interrelationships between the units that 
compose the nation. Moreover, the particular insights gained 
by case studies, both past and future, will be augmented by 
putting into a wider context the village or province chosen for 
such a study; e.eg., whether it is one that was progressing at a 
faster or slower rate than its counterparts in the nation,
whether it was situated in a region that was typical of the 
nation at that time period, or whether there were some peculiar
characteristics possessed by it that would warn against taking 
it as a "typical" unit for study. 
Second, as a result of carrying forward the analysis that 
has grown out of Young's work, applying his ideas to old but 
newly recognized phenomena and of developing new hypotheses,
this study has theoretical implications in that it suggests an 
approach that may prove useful to students of countries which 
are at about the same stage of development as Thailand. 
Third, since each research style develops its own research 
methods and analysis techniques, to say nothing of preferred 
2. There are actually 7 2 provi-nces in Thailand today. The 7 ls t 
province, Kalasin, was created in 1947, but is not accounted 
for in the 1947 census and hence discussions of 1947 center 
around sixty-eight provinces. The 72nd province, Yasothon, 
was created after the period with which this study is con­
cerned and hence is not included in the discussion. The 
two remaining provinces of Phranakorn and Thonburi, which 
make up Greater Bangkok, the metropolis, are excluded from 
this analysis. 
3 
data, the approach employed in this study has methodological
implications. In particular, it offers the advantage of having 
great applicability to available qualitative data and much 
lessened reliance on census material. This latter fact, con­
sidering the suspicion with which the reliability of census 
data in the Third World is viewed, is of considerable signifi­
cance. The approach employed here can, unlike the case study,
lead to a cumulative growth in knowledge of the dynamics of 
development in Thailande. 
THEORETICAL ORIENTATION 
The following theoretical orientatione3 will guide our 
analysis. Social units, nations, regions, provinces, etc.e, are 
viewed as units within systems, and these systems in turn are 
seen as subsystems within larger-systemse. Thus, the region is 
composed of a number of provinces, but the region itself is part 
of a system of regions that go to make up the national system,
which itself is a unit in the Southeast Asian system of nations 
which ultimately is a part of the international system of 
nations. Although these larger systems will be referred to we 
will concentrate on the provincial level. 
To illustrate the approach of this study let us take a 
province and examine the types of questions that might be asked 
and the assumptions that will be made. Building on the work of 
Durkheim, the approach that Young has stimulated sees "develop­
ment" as an increasing differentiation of information process­
ing4 in all spheres of life of any particular system. Thus, in 
the case of a province one might expect development to manifest 
itself not purely in economic terms, but also in a differentia­
tion of information-processing institutions throughout all 
spheres of the system's publicly discriminated sectorse. Thus, 
a differentiated province would be expected to have a greater
variety of institutions in the educational, economic, public
health, cultural, etc., spheres of provincial life than a less 
differentiated one. That this is the case has been shown by
earlier studies (see for example, Spencer, 1967) and has also 
been replicated in this study. However, how does a province 
move from a less differentiated to a more differentiated level? 
One explanation for this has been developed by.Young where he 
sees this as a process by which the province unites as a sub­
system in what has been termed a "solidarity movement" to "buck" 
the larger system and communicate to the latter that it has 
inadequate access to the "information" flowing throughout the 
system. Moreover, having the capacity to handle a greater
diversity of information than its "relative centrality"e5 in the 
3. For the original conceptual formulation out of which this 
study is derived, see Young (1966, and 1970)e. 
4. "The framework assumes that for theoretical purposes, the 
phenomena of human society and culture may be construed as 
structures of meaning or information" (Young, 1966:46). 
5 .  Seen by Young (1966:47) as a province's position relative to 
other provinces in the total configuration of intercommuni­
cative pathse. 
4 
5 
system at present allows it, this subsystem, through its soli­
darity movement, will tend to organize, petition and generally 
attract the attention of the larger system until the structural 
bind in which it finds itself has been relieved. 
An approach to the question of development in terms of 
structural "differentiation," which one would expect to be per­
vasive and manifest throughout a iocial structure, would give
data and indices an interchangeability that is especially im­
portant in studies of nations in the underdeveloped world . This 
latter point will be made clearer as the study progressese. 
Central to this study will be an abilit.y to measure "develop­
ment" or, as we shall term it, "structural diff�rentiatione. "  
For this, the Guttman scale of institutional complexity has 
proved eminently successful. 
The study is divided into two parts, each centering on the 
test of an hypo�hesise. Part I develops measures of 4ifferentia­
tion and tests the hypothesis that the structural differentia­
tion of a province is systemic and manifests itself in all 
spheres of public life·eand throughout the provin.cial structuree. 
In testing this hypothesis, the ·study replicates the findings
of a growing body of empirical studies and brings a new measure­
ment technique to the study of "development'' in ·Thailande. 
Part II uses the measures of the first part and examines. 
the relationship between the dynamics of structural growth and 
the incidence of recent political conflict (terrorism and in­
surgency) in Thailand . In an exploratory manner the hypothesis
is tested that if a rigid national system, dominated by the 
national capital, pla�es barriers in the way of.rapidly differ­· entiating subsystems political conflict will resulte. This· 
hypothesis thus stands in sharp contrast to the conventional 
view of insurrection in Thailand as largely being the result of 
Communist insurgency exploiting local povertye. 
PART I 
THE MEASUREMENT OF STRUCTURAL DIFFERENTIATION 
The Guttman Scale as a Measure of 
Structural Differentiation 
The Guttman scale is an instrument which cumulatively and 
unidimensionally measures social phenomena. It was first used 
to measure attitudes and other phenomena at the individual level 
of analysis, and its cumulative nature can be illustrated by a 
simple example. Imagine a scale beginning with (1) "Blacks are 
not inferior to whites," and gradually elaborating through the 
stages of (2) "Blacks should have the same rights as whites," 
(3) "Segregation is wrong," (4) "I would sit next to a Black on 
the bus," (5) "I would not object to a Black family living next 
door,e" and (6) "I would not object to my child marrying a Black.e" 
Anyone who holds view (4) is very likely to hold views (1-3)
and anyone with view (6) would be expected to have all the 
other views. 
This cumulative and unidimensional quality has been shown 
to characterize the process of development. Institutions of 
social systems, be they villages, towns, regions or nations, 
are ordered in a predictable and cumulative fashion as they be­
come increasingly differentiated. (See Young and Fujimoto, 
1965; and Young, Spencer and Flora, 1965_; and similar works 
cited in these studies. ) In a typical case, a small town may
begin with a primary school, and then add in succession a junior
secondary school, a junior trade school, a senior secondary
school, an advanced trade school, and finally a university. The 
sequence is not always perfect, but the final outcome tends to 
be cumulative. The Young et ale. and other works have shown that 
while a social system may be elaborating its institutional com­
plexity in one area, for example the educational, there is also 
a concomitant elaboration of institutions in all other spheres,
such as public health (hospitals) , government and commerce. 
(See in particular Spencer, 1967; and Witton, 1969.) In addi­
tion, the physical appearance of the system becomes more differ­
entiated and complex. Thus the whole social structure can be 
seen to be permeated by and to reflect its structural differen­
tiation. (See Young and MacCannell, 1967 . )  Guttman scales 
measure this elaboration of institutions by directly tapping
the structural differentiation of the relevant units and in its 
ability to do this lies their unidimensional quality. Aggrega­
tive measures can only measure social structure indirectly. 
6 
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To gain familiarity with, and a feeling for, this instru­
ment, a short discussion of a few specific scales may be help­
ful. The first scale (see Tables la and lb) uses the presence 
or absence of occupations as the index of differentiation and 
reveals their diversity among the sixty-eight provinces of Thai­
land in one particular year, 1947. -The scale has seventeen 
items (occupations) (Thailand Population Census, 1947) which 
progress from the most common--teacher--to the most infrequent
--porter--and hence seventeen ranks, the rank of a particular
province being determined by the scale step it has reached. 
Thtis, for example, Chainat has a ranking of 7, Mahasarakham of 
10, and Ayuthaya of 16. Furthermore, because the scale is cumu­
lative Chainat has all the items from 1 through 7, Mahasarakham 
from 1 through 10, etc. This cumulative ordering is taken as a 
measure of the level of "development" of the provinces. 
Table la. Scale of Occupational Differentiation for 68 Thai 
Provinces, 1947 
Proportion Number ofItem Conten.t of Sample Item Errors 
1 Teacher 1.00 0 
12 Welder or metal worker 
23 Actor or musician 
74 Photographer 
55 Launderer 
76 Chauffeur 
7 Auto repairer 6 
78 Electrician 
9 Designer . 66 6 
.810 Money collector 
611 Train operator 
12 Typesetter .39 7 
13 Movie operator .36 4 
14 Undertaker . 33 10 
9·15 Pharmacist 
1016 Gas station attendant 
17 Porter .26 9 
Coefficient of scalability: . 66 
Source: Thaitand PopuZation Census, 1947. 
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Table lbe. Scalogram of Occupational Differentiation for 68 Thai 
Provinces, 1947 
Provinces Item Content 
•Grouped by (Corresponding to Items 1n Table la)
Scale or 
Error Pattern 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  11 12 13 14 15 16  17 
Suphanburi
Nontaburi 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
l·  
1 
1 
Khonkaen 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
N. Sritammarat 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Lampang 
N. Sawan 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
N. Nayok 
Chachoensao 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
Yala 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
Ratburi 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
Chonburi 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
Ayuthaya
Saraburi 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
Phichit 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
Pitsanuloke 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
N .  Pathom 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Lopburi 
Petchburi 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Chiengmai
Korat 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Samutsakorn 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Suratthani 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
Chumporn
Songkhla
Samutprakarn
Angthong
Ubol 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
· o  
0 
0 
0 
Pathumthani 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Kanjanaburi 
Prajuab
Prachinburi 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
Chiengrai
Chantaburi 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
Uthaithani 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Udorn 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Phrae 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Trang 
Lamphun
N. Panom 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Mahasarakham 
Ranong 
Phuket 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
Samutsongkhram 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
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Table lb  (continued) 
Provinces Item Content 
•
Grouped by (Corresponding to Items 1n Table la)
Scale or 
Error Pattern 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  1 1  1 2  1 3  14  1'5 1 6  1 7  
Phang-nga 1 
Singburi 1 
Pattani 1 
Rayong 1 
Nan 1 
Nongkhai 1 
Narathiwat 1 
Tak 1 
Sukhothai 1 
Chainat 1 
Trad 1 
Patalung 1 
Chaiyaphum 1 
Krabi 1 
Petchbun 1 
Roi-et 1 
S. Nakorn 1 
Uttaradit 1 
Surin 1 
Buriram 1 
Srisaket 1 
Satun 1 
Kamphaengphet 1 
Maehorngsorn 1 
Loey 1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
: 1  
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
- 0  
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 1 
0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
.
Note : " 1  '' signifies the presence of at least one such item 1n the 
province; " 0 "  signifies the absence of such an item. 
However, it can be observed that some items are absent where 
they should appear, for example "electrician" in the case of 
Lamphun. Conversely, an item may be present where it would not 
be expected, for example,· "movie operator" in the case of Udon. 
Thes e are "error" cases and a satisfactory or at least plausible
explanation should be pos sible for each one. However, that is 
the task of a case study and is outside the purview of this 
paper. What is important is that the scale shows that these are 
exceptions to the general pattern. These "errors·" are, however,
taken into conseideration in computing the coefficient of scala­
bility which measures the reliability of a scale.e6 
6 .  See Menzel ( 1 9 5 3 )  who suggests . 6 5 as the minimum coefficient 
of scalability. 
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The second scale (see Tables 2a and 2b) also uses occupa­
tions as the index of differentiation for one particular yeare, 
1960 (Thai land Population Census, 1960 )  . 
Table 2ae. Scale of Occupational Differentiation for 69 Thai 
Provinces, 1960 
Proportion Number ofItem Content of Sample .Item Errors 
1 Teacher 1.00 0 
2 Dentist . 89 5 
3 Insurance or real-estate 
salesman of securities or 
services 2 
114 Accountant, professional 
5 Conductor or brakeman, 
railway . 66 6 
6 Longshoreman 7 
7 Precision instrument maker 
or watchmaker . 35 5 
8 Compositor or typesetter . 20 3 
9 Painter, sculptor or related 
creative artist 5 
10 Sugar or chocolate 
confectionary maker .13 2 
11 Athlete, sportsman or 
related worker . 10 1 
12 Welder . 08 1 
13 Bookbinder . 08 2 
14 Stenographer .04 0 
Coefficient of scalability : . 71 
Source: Thai land Population Census, 196 0 . 
1 1  
1 3  1 4  
Table 2b .  Scalogram of Occupational Differentiation for 69 
Thai Provinces, 1 9 6 0  
Item Content 
•Provinces Grouped by (Corresponding to _Items 1n Table 2a)
Scale or Error Pattern 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  1 1  1 2  
Ubol 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Khonkaen 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 · 0 
Pattani 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
Chumporn 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
N .  Panom 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0Udorn 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Pattalung 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Yala 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Nongkhai 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Phuket 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0N .  Sawan 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 
N .  Sritammarat 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Trang 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Samutsakorn 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Suratthani 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Narathiwat 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chachoensao 1 1 1 0 1 · 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chainat 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Chiengmai 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Chantaburi 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Lampang 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Korat 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Phetburi 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Srisaket 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Suphanburi 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Surin 1 0 1 0 1 1 
Songkhla 1 1 1 l· 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Buriram l ·  1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Phichit 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Saraburi 1 1 1 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Prajeuab 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ranong 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chonburi 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Prachinburi 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pathumthani 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kanchanaburi 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 o. 0 0 0 
Ratburi 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lopburi 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sukhothai 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nakorn Pathom 1 . 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Angthong 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Rayong 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 · 0 0 0 0 0 · o 0 
Pitsanuloke 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 2b (continued) 
Item Content 
•
Provinces Grouped by (Corresponding to Items 1n Table 2a) 
Scale or Error Pattern 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  1 1  1 2  1 3  1 4  
Ayuthaya
Samutprakarn
Uttaradit 
Tak 
Phrae 
Chayaphum
Kalasin 
Roi-et 
S. Nakorn 
Samutsongkhram
Phang-nga
Chiengrai
Singburi
Uthaithani 
N. Nayok
Lamphun
Mahasarakham 
Satun 
Krabi 
Nontaburi 
Petchbun 
Nan 
Trad 
Loey
Kamphaengphet
Maehongsorn 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
Since we are concerned with an analysis of change over time, a 
consideration of the 1 9 6 0  scale in conjunction with the 1 9 4 7  
one is necessary. A comparison of the scales in Tables 1 and 2 
indicates that between 1 9 4 7  and 1960  there has been a general 
overall increase in differentiation throughout the country and 
this contention is supported by the following observations : 
1. The occupation which appears in both scales, i. e.e, 
railroad operator, is present in a higher proportion 
of provinces in 1 9 6 0  than in 1 9 4 7 :  66 and 40 per cent 
respectively. 
2. The other occupation which appears in both scales, 
i . e., welder, unlike railroad operator, is present in 
a smaller proportion of provinces in 1960  than in 1 9 4 7 :  
13  
8 and 97 per cent respectively. However, it can be 
argued that the welder of 1960 is a much more special­
ized craftsman than the welder of 1947, and that many 
of the workers who would have been classed as "welder" 
in 1947 have been included in the 1960 Census as 
"craftsmen, production process . workers" or "furnacemen, 
rollers, drawers, moulders and related workers,e" occu­
pations that were present in all provinces in 1960, 
and that were not included in the 1947 Censuse. 
3. The presence of actors and musicians in the 1947 scale 
but not in the 1960 one may be an indication that 
traditional forms of enteertainment became less and 
less popular in the face of more "modern" types of 
entertainment such as movies (the absence of movie 
.operators in the 1960 scale is attributed to a census­
taking error or the possible inclusion of these movie 
operators in another occupational category)e. 
4 .  Occupations in the 1960 scale, such as dentist and 
insurance salesman seem to be more "sophisticated" in 
terms of education and other skill qualifications than 
those of the 1947 scalee. 
S. Chauffeurs and launderers, both present in 81 per cent 
of the provinces in 1947, are present in all of the 
provinces in 1960 and for this reason are not included 
in the latter scale. 
6 .  Pharmacists and electricians, rather "sophisticated"
occupations, appear in the 1947 scale but have not 
been used in the 1960 one because there were either 
too many error items when included in the latter or 
because they failed _to discriminate a sufficient number 
of provinces to warrant their inclusione. However, 
these occupations occur in the Combined Occupations
Scale (Tables 3a and 3b) and it can be seen that they 
are present in a higher proportion of the provinces in 
1960 than in 1947e. 
We have, then, a comparison of change over time (1947-1960),
utilizing two occupational scales (T�bles 1 and 2) which are 
made up of different items, and it has been argued that a 
general increase in differentiation occurrede. The same argument 
can be made in terms of a single scale (see Tables 3a and 3b)
having items common to two time periods, each province appearing 
twice, once in 1947 and once in 1960. Thus Table 3b shows that 
the provinces with the high rank levels tend to be predominantly 
those in 1960 ; provinces at the lower levels are thos� in 
1947e. 
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Table 3a. Scale of Occupational Differentiation for 69 Thai 
Provinces, 1947 and 1960 
Proportion Number ofItem Content of Sample Item Errors 
1 Driver of motorized land 
vehicles-road transport 1 . 00 2 
2 Lawyer . 99 1 
13 Fisherman 
44 Doctor 
75 Launderer 
86 Clerical worker 
7 Electrician . 89 8 
1 18 Telegraph operator 
9 Cloth dyer 19 
1 110 Metal worker 
11 Potter 14 
12 Toolmaker 10 
2513 Conductor or brakeman 
14 Pharmacist 14 
15 Chemist . 16 1 1  
Number of cases: 137* 
Coefficient of scalability: .68  
Sourcee: Thailand Population Census, 194? and Thailand Population 
Census, 1960. 
* One of the provinces, Kalasin, was created during this time 
period, and so appears in 1960 and 1966 scales, but is absent 
from 1947 scales. 
1 5  
1 5  
1 . 
Table 3b. Scalogram of Occupational Differentiation for 69 Thai 
Provincese, 1947  and 1960  
Item Content 
•Provinces Grouped (Corresponding to Items 1n Table 3a)by Scale or 
Error Pattern 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  1 1  1 2  1 3  1 4  
Ka�chanaburie, 1960  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Khonkaene, 1960  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Chonburie, 1960  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Chainate, 1960  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
N .  Pathome, 1960  1 1 1 1 1 1 l 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
N .  Ratchasimae, 1960  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
N .  Srithammarate, 1960  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
N .  Sawane, 1960  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Nonthaburie, 1960  1 1 - 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Phetburie, 1960  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Rayonge, 1960  l 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
Ratburi , 1960  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Lampange, 1960  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 11960Loeye, 
Srisakete, 1960  
Suphanburie, 1960  
Surine, 1960  
Ayuthayae, 1960  . 
Ayuthaya , 1947  
Udone, 1960  
Uttaradite, 1960  
Ubone, 1960  
Chantaburie, 1960  
Chachoengsaoe, 1960  
Chonburie, 1 9 4 7  
Chumphone, 1960  
Chiangraie, 1960  
Chiangmaie, 1960  
Trange, 1960  
Tak ,  1960  
N. Nayok , 1960  
N .  Srithammarate, 1947  
N .  Sawane, 1947  
Nonthaburie, 1947  
Nongkhai , 1960  
Prachinburie, 1960  
Phange-ngae, 1960  
Phichite, 1960  
Phitsanulok, 1960  
Phitsanuloke, 1947  
Phukete, 1960  
Lopburi, 1960  
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
.l 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
l 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
· 1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
- 1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 1 1 1 0 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 0 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 0 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 0 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 0 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 0 1 
1 1 0 1 1 
1 0 1 1 1 
1 0 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 1 1 
1 1 1 0 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
, 1 1 0 1 1 
1 1 1 0 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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Tab l e  3b ( cont inued) 
Item Content
Provinces Grouped (Corresponding to I tems in Tab l e  3a)
by Scale or 
Error Pattern 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Lopburi ,  19 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
Lampang , 19 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Lamphun , 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
Songkhla ,  1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Songkhl a ,  19 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
S .  Prakan , 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
S .  Songkhram , 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
s .  Sakhon , 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Saraburi ,  1960 
Sukhothai  , 1960 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
Suratthani  , 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Angthong , 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Uthai thani  , 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
N. Ratchas ima , 19 4 7  
Narath iwat  , 1960 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Buriram ,  1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1. 1 1 0 0 
Pathumthani  , 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Pathumthani  , 19 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Prachuap , 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Phathalung , 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Phetbur i ,  19 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Phrae , 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Yal a ,  1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Ratburi ,  194 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Krab i ,  1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Kalas  in , 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Kamphaengphe t ,  1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Chayaphum , 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Trat  , 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
N .  Phanom , 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Nan , 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Phetchabun , 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Mahasarakham , 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Maehongson , 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Roi  - e t  , 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Ranong , 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
S .  Nakhon , 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Satun , 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
S ingburi ,  1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Chiangrai  , 194 7  
Prachinburi ,  194 7  
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
u 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
Patt ani  , 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Roi - et , 19 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
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Tab le  3b ( continued) 
I t em C ontent Provinces Grouped •(Corresponding to Items in Tab l e  3a)by Scale or 
Error Pattern 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Sukhothai , 19 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Chantaburi , 194 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Chumphon , 19 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Chiangmai , 19 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Trang , 19 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 
Nongkhai , 194 7  1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Phang - ng a ,  194 7  
Phrae , 194 7  
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
Phuket ,  19 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
S .  Nakhon , 194 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
S .  Prakan , 19 4 7  
Ubon , 194 7 
Chachoengsao  , 194 7  
N .  Nayok  , 19 4 7  
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
N .  Pathom , 19 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 .  1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
N.  Phanom , 19 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pattani , 19 4 7  
Phichit , 19 4 7  
S .  S akhon , 19 4 7  
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Saraburi , 19 4 7  1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Singburi , 19 4 7  1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Suphanburi , 194 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Uttaradit , 194 7  1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Chayaphum , 19 4 7  1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Trat  , 19 4 7  
Narathiwat , 19 4 7  
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Phetchabun , 194 7  1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Rayong , 19 4 7  1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Udon , 19 4 7  
Kanchanaburi·, 19 4 7  
Khonkaen , 19 4 7  
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
Tak ,  19 4 7 
Prachuap , 194 7  
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Mahasarakham, 19 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Yala , 194 7  
Ranong , 194 7  
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Suratthani , 194 7  1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Chainat , 194 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Nan , 194 7 1 1 1 1 · 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Phathalung , 19 4 7  1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
S atun , 194 7 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Krabi , 19 4 7  1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .  0 
Lamphun , 194 7  1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 3b (continued) 
Item Content Provinces Grouped .(Corresponding to Items 1n Table 3a)by Scale or 
Error Pattern 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
S. Songkhram, 1947 1 1 1 1 0 
Angthong, 1947 1 1 1 1 0 
Uthaithani, 1947 1 1 1 1 0 
Kamphaengphet, 1947 1 1 1 0 
Burirame, 1947 1 1 1 0 0 
Surin, 1947 1 1 1 0 0 
Srisaket, 1947 0 1 0 0 
Maehongson, 1947 1 1 0 0 0 
Loeye, 1947 1 0 0 0 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 1 
0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
Table 3c. Rearrangement* of Table 3b. 
Item Content 
(Corresponding to Items in Table Province Year 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15  
Krabi 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
1947 1 1 1 0 1 I o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kanchanaburi 1960 1- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1947 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I o 0 0 0 . 1 1 0 1 
Kalasin 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
I
1947 (Not yet 1n existence) 
Kamphaengphet 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I o 0 0 
1947 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Khonkaen 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1947 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 . 1 0 1 1 0 
Chantaburi 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 0 
1947 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Chachoengsao 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 0 
1947 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Chonburi 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1947 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 � r}J  
This rearrangement facilitates the examination of the increase 
in occupational differentiation of each province between 1947 
and 1960. 
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Tab l e  3c (continued) 
I tem Content 
(Corresponding to I t ems 
3 4 5 6 
in Table Province Year 
1 
3 a) 
1 3  
1 1 
1 2 7 8 9 1 0  1 1  
i IChainat 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 9 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 I o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chay aphum 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
1 9 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
Chumporn 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I o
1 9 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 ' 1 1 0 1 I o 0 1 0 0 
Chiangrai 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 O · 1 I o
1 9 4 7  1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Chiangmai 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I o 
1 9 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I o 0 1 0 0 
Trang 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I o 
1 9 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 I o 0 0 1 0 
Trat 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
1 9 4 7  1 . 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 I o 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tak 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 · 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I
1 9 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 0 1 I o 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Nakhon Nayok 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l · 1 1 0 1 0 1 I 0 
1 9 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 ro 0 0 1 1 0 
Nakhon Pathom 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I
1 9 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I o 0 0 1 1 0 
Nakhon Phanom 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 0 0 0 
1 9 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 · O 1 I o 0 0 0 0 0 
N .  Ratchas ima 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 9 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
S r ithammarat 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 9 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 r¼l 
Nakhon Sawan 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 .  1 1 1 1 1 
� r--a-J1 9 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Nonthaburi 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 r-aJ 
1 9 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 · 1  1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
Narathiwat 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 0 0 
1 9 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nan 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 · 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 0 0 1 
1 9 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 I 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Nongkhai 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 0 
1 9 4 7  1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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Tab l e  3c (continued) 
I tem Content 
(Corresponding to I t ems in Tab l e  3a) Province Year 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  11  13  14  1 5  
Buriram 1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 0 
1947  1 1 1 1 I 0 r0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pathumthani 1960 1 
1947 1 
Prachuap 1 960  1 
194 7  1 
Prachinburi 1960 1 
1947  0 
Pattani 1960 1 
194 7  1 
Phang -nga 1960 1 
1947  1 
Phathalung 1960 1 
1 94 7  . 1 
Phichit 1960 1 
194 7  1 
Phi t s ahulok 1960 1 
1947  1 
Phetchabun 1960 1 
1947  1 
Phetburi 1 960  1 
1 94 7  1 
Phrae 1960 1 
1 94 7  1 
Phuket 1 960  1 
1 94 7  1 
Mahas arakham 1 960  1 
1 94 7  1 
Maehongs on 1960 1 
1 94 7  1 
Yala 1 960  1 
1947 1 
Roi -Et 1960 1 
1 94 7  1 
Ranong 1 96 0  1 
194 7  1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 .  1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 I o 0 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 C 1 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
1 0 1 I 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 i I 0 
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 o · 0 
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 I 0 
1 0 1 1 1 1 I 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 I 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
1 1 1 1 1 I o 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
0 1 0 1 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 I o 0 0 1 0 
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 i I 0 
1 1 1 1 0 1 10 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 0 0 0 
1 1 1 I o 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
1 1 1 I o 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 r¼1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 o 0 0 
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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Tab l e  3 c  (continued) 
I t em Content 
(Corresponding to I t ems in Table 3a) Province Year 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  1 1  1 2  1 3  1 4  1 5  
Rayong 1960  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 I
1 9 4 7  1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 I o 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ratbur i 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 9 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Lopburi 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1· 1 1 1 0 
1 9 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
Lampang 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 9 4 7  1 1 1 l 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 � 
L amphun 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 I o 
1 9 4 7  1 1 1 0 1 I o 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Loey 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
1 9 4 7  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sris aket 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
1 9 4 7  0 1 1 I o 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Sakon Nakhon 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
1 9 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Songkhla 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 9 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0� I 0 
Satun 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 0 0 0 
1 9 4 7  1 1 1 1 0 1 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Samut P rakan 1960  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 9 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 0 0 1 0 0 
Samut Songkhram 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 I 0 
1 9 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 I o 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
S amut Sakhon 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 0 
·1 9 4 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Saraburi 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 l · 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I o 
1 9 4 7  1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 I o 0 0 1 1 0 
S ingburi 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 0 0 0 
1 9 4 7  1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 I o 0 0 0 0 1 
Sukhothai 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i I 0 
1 9 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Suphanburi 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I
1 9 4 7  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 I o 0 0 0 1 0 
Suratthani 1 9 6 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I
1947 1 1 1 · 1 1 0 1 I o 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
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Table 3c (continued) 
Item Content 
(Corresponding to Items in Table 3a)Province Year 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Surin 1960 
1947 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
Ayuthaya 1960 
1947 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Angthong 1960 
1947 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 · 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
Udon 1960 
1947 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 1 
o .  0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
Uttaradit 1960 
1947 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 1 
o· 1 
Uthaithani 1960 
1947 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
Ubon 1960 
1947 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 1 
1 I 0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
Furthermore, this scale allows one to see whether or not particu­
lar provinces elaborated their structures during that time period,
that is, whether new occupations were gained and hence whether 
the province moved up in rank,e7 e. g. , Nakhon Pathom and Buriram 
which increased their ranks from 9th to 15th and from 4th to 13th 
respectively; whether "consolidation" took place, that is, 
"errors" were "filled in," e. g. , Pathumthani and Songkhla whose 
rank levels did not increase but whose errors were "filled in"; 
or whether both types of phenomena occurred, e . g . e, Chayaphum and 
Saraburi which increased their ranks from 8th to 1 2th and from 
9th to 14th respectively, but also "filled in" two errors each. 
Several scales of structural differentiation were constructed 
and their reliability was established. That is, rankings were 
made on different institutions--occupations, banks, theaters, 
etc.e--and all gave essentially the same results, thus confirming
the already established finding that social systems differentiate 
simultaneously and to a similar degree in all spheres of social 
activity. Moreover, scales were constructed for the periods
1947, 1960 and 1966  to enable the examination of the process of 
development. 
7. See Table 3c in which the scale has been rearranged to permit 
one more easily to compare each province in 1947 and 1960. 
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For 1960, data were available to make the following scales : 
Banks only 8 (Table 4) ; Occupations9 (Table 2); and Occupations 
and Banks (Table 5). For 196 6, data permitted the construction 
of the following scales : Banks onlye1 0 (Table 6); Banks, Thea­
ters,e1 1  Hotels,e1 2 Newspapers,e1 3 Airportse1 4  and Young Buddhist 
Associationse1 5  (Table 7); and banks common to the 1960 and 196 6 
time periods (Table 8), a scale which permitse- an examination o f  
the change in rank of provinces in that scale over the time 
period, as was done for common occupations in the 1947-1960 time 
periods (see discussion of Table 3 above). The coefficiente· of 
scalability for each of these six scales and the two others 
using 1947 data was above the acceptable .6 5 level. 
Briefly, with regard to the scales, several things should 
be noted: 
1. The Banks and Occupations, 1960, scale does not have 
all the items of the separate scales. While all items 
should be accounted for, and given time and space the 
elimination of each item could be explainede, here the 
purpose is mainly to demonstrate and make concrete· the 
theoretical contention that differentiation or develop­
ment is systemic and that social, economic and politi­
cal indices may be considered interchangeable so that 
whichever indices are chosen to construct a scale a 
consistent ranking of provinces will emerge. 
2. Items 2 and 3 of the Bank, 1960, scale each consist of 
two banks which may be considered functionally alter­
nate institutions at that particular level of differen­
tiation and at that particular period. It appears that 
at ranks 2 and 3 provinces in 1960 tended to have 
8. Department of Commercial Intelligence, Commercial Directory
of Thai land (1959-60), Sece. 6. 
9. Thai land Population Census �  1 9 60. 
10e. Thai land Year Book 1966-67 (2nd ed. ), Sec. C; and The Siam 
Directory, BE 2509-10 (196 6 - 67), Sec. D. 
11. Ibid., Sec. E :  2 5 - 27 and Sece. C respectively. 
12. Ibid . ,  Sec. E: 60 - 6 1, and Sec. F :  69, 70, 73, respectively. 
13. Ibid., Sec. G: 138-149, and Sec. B :  91, 93, respectively. 
14. Thai land Year Book 196 6 - 67 (2nd ed.), Sec. C :  260. 
15. Ibid.e, Sec. D: 140e- 143. 
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Table 4. Scale of Differentiation of Banks for 69 Thai 
Provinces, 1960 
Proportion Number ofItem Content of Sample Item Errors 
1 Government Savings Bank 1 .00 0 
2 Siam City Bank or 
Agricultural Bank . 67 4 
3 Bangkok Bank of Commerce 
or Thai Farmers Bank . 3 5  1 
4 The Provincial Bank 6 
5 Siam Commercial Bank 1 
6 Bank of Ayuthaya 5 
7 Bangkok Bank . 0 6  3 
8 Bank of Asia for Industry
and Commerce . 03 2 
Number of cases : 69 
Coefficient of scalabei l ity : . 74 
Provinces discriminated by each of the above scale steps are as 
follows : 
8 Songkhla , Chonburi 
7 Chiangmai ,  Lampang 
6 N .  Ratchasima 
5 N .  Srithammarat, Trang, N. Sawan, Phetburi, Chiangrai 
4 Phuket, N. Pathom, Suratthani 
3 Chumphum, Yala, Udon, Khonkaen, S .  Sakhon, Chachoengsao,
Phitsanulok, Ratburi, Phrae, Ranong, Lamphun 
2 Phathalung, Nongkhai, Narathiwat, Phang-nga, Chayaphum,
Chantaburi, Pattani, Surin, Phichit, Saraburi, Suphanburi,
Tak, Kanchanaburi, Prachinburi, Rayong, Lopburi, S. Songkhram,
S. Prakan, Uthaithani, Krab i, Satun, Phetchabun 
1 N. Phanom, Ubon, Buriram, Srisaket, Prachuap, Sukhothai, 
Uttaradit, Chainat, Pathumthani, Ayuthaya, Angthong, Kalasin, 
Roi-et, S .  Nakhon, Singburi, Mahasarakham, N .  Nayok, Nan, 
Trat, Nonthaburi, Loey, Kamphaengphet, Maehongson 
Source : Commeraial Direatory for Thailand, 1959- 196 0 .  
2 5  
Table 5 .  Scale of Differentiation of Banks and Occupations for 
69 Thai Provinces, 1960 
Proportion Number ofItem Content of Sample Item Errors 
1 Teacher 
2 Government Savings Bank 
3 ·  Dentist 
4 Insurance salesman 
5 Siam City Bank or 
Agricultural Bank 
6 Bangkok Bank of Commerce 
or the Thai Farmers Bank 
7 Compositors 
8 Provincial Bank 
1 0  Siam Commercial 
10 Bank of Asia for Industry
and Commerce 
1 . 0 0 0 
1.00 0 
. 96  5 
. 90 2 
. 67 4 
. 38 3 
. 22 9 
.12  3 
.09 5 
. 04 1 
Coefficient of scalability: .69 
Provinces discriminated by each of the above scale steps are as 
follows: 
10 Chonburi, N. Srithammarat, Songkhla 
8 Trang, N .  Sawan, Phetburi 
7 N .  Pathon, Phuket 
6 Khonkaen, Chumphon, Nongkhai·ej - Pattani, Phathalung, Yala,
Udon 
5 Chachoengsao, Chiangrai, Chiangmai, N .  Ratchasima, Phitsa­
nulok, Phrae, Ranong, Ratburi, Lampang, Lamphun, S .  Sakhon 
4 Krabi, Kanchanaburi, Chantaburi, Chayaphum, Tak, Narathiwat,
Prachinburi, Phang-nga, Phichit, Phetchabun, Rayong, Lopburi,
Satun, S. Prakan, S .  Songkhram, Saraburi, Suphanburi, Surat­
thani, Surin, Uthaithani 
3 Kalasin, Chainat, N. Nayok, N. Phanom, Burirame, Prachuap,
Mahasarakham, Roi-et, Srisaket, S. Nakhon, Singburi, Sukho­
thai, Ayuthaya, Angthong, Uttaradit, Ubon 
2 Trat, Nonthaburi, Nan, Pathumthani 
1 Kamphaengphet, Maehongson, Loey 
Sources: Thailand Population Census, 196 0  and Commeraial 
Dire ctory for Thailand, 1959- 196 0 .  
2 6  
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Table 6 .  Scale of Differentiation of Banks for 69 Provinces, 
1966 
Proportion Number ofItem Content of Sample Item Errors 
2 Government Savings Bank 1. 00 0 
2 Agricultural Bank . 88 12  
3 Bangkok Bank of Commerce . 65 6 
4 Thai Development Bank . 4 1  11 
5 Thai Farmers Bank 7 
6 Siam Commercial Bank . 13 4 
7 Bank of Asia for Industry 
and Commerce . 07 0 
8 Banque de l ' Indochine . 07 0 
Coefficient of scalability : • 66 
Provinces discriminated by each of the above scale steps are as 
follows: 
8 Chonburi, N. Ratchasima, N .  Srithammarat, Yala, Songkhla 
7 Khonkaen, Chiangmai, N .  Sawan, Udon 
6 Chachoengsao, Chumphon, Trang, Nan, Phitseanulok, Phrae,
Phuket 
5 Chantaburi, Chayaphum, N .  Pathom, Nonthaburi, Narathiwat, 
Buriram, Phichit, Ranong, Ratburi, S .  Prakan, Uttaradit, 
Uthaithani 
4 Chiangrai, Trat, N .  Phanom, Nongkhai, Prachuap, Phetchabun, 
Phetburi, Rayong, Lampang, Lamphun, S. Songkhram, S. Sakhon,
Saraburi, Sukhothai, Suphanburi, Surin, Ayuthaya 
3 Kalasin, Chainat, Tak, N .  Nayok, Prachinburi, Pattani, Phathae­
lung, Mahasearakham, Roi-et, Lopburi, S. Nakhon, Satun, Sing­
buri, Suratthani, Angthong, Ubon 
2 Krabi, Kanchanaburi, Kamphaengphet, Pathumthani, Phange-nga, 
Maehongson, Loey, Srisaket 
Source: Siam Direatory , 1 9 66- 6 7  and Thai l and Yearbook,  1 9 6 6- 6 7 .  
2 7  
Table 7. Scale of Differentiation of Banks and Other Institue­
tions for 69 Thai Provinces, 1966 
Proportion Number ofItem Content of Sample Item Errors 
2 Government Savings Bank 
2 Theatre 
3 ·  Hotel 
4 Bangkok Bank of Commerce 
5 Newspaper 
6 Airport 
7 Bangkok Bank 
8 Siam Commercial Bank 
9 Bank of Asia for Industry
and Commerce 
10 Banque de l ' eIndochine 
1.00 0 
. 84 10 
. 7 5  8 
. 57 10 
. 38 9 
. 29 6 
. 23 6 
. 1 4  1 
. 06 1 
. 0 6  1 
Coefficient of scalability : . 65  
Provinces discriminated by each of the above scale steps are as 
followse: 
10 Songkhela, Chonburi, N. Ratchasima, Yala 
9 Lampang, Chiangmai, Udon, Khonkaen, Chiangrai, N. Sawan 
8 Trang, Pattani, Ubon, Phuket, Phitsanulok, Saraburi 
7 Prachuap, Phrae, N. Phanom, Nongkhai 
6 Suratthani, Lopburi, Uttaradit, N. Pathom, Sukhothai, Ratburi 
S N. Srithammarat, 
ram, Suphanburi,
bun, Trat 
Chumphon, Chantaburi, Ranong, Phichit, Buri-
Rayong, Ayuthaya, Phetburi, Surin, Phetcha­
4 Chachoengsao, Narathiwat, 
Roi-et, Chainat, Kalasin, 
Krabi, Loey 
Kanchanaburi, Prachinburi, Tak, 
Kamphaengphet, Srisaket, N. Nayoke, 
3 Phathalung, 
phum 
Uthaithani, Phang-nga, Satune� S. Nakhon, Chaya­
2 S. Prakan, Nonthaburi, Lamphun,
thong, Mahasarakham, S. Sakhon, 
S .  Songkhram, Singburi, Ang­
Nan, Maehongson, Pathumthani 
Sources: Siam Direotory, 1 9 66 - 6 ?  and Thai land Year Book, 1 9 6 6 .  
3 . 4 5  
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Table 8 .  Scale of 
1960  and 
Item 
Differentiation 
1966  
Content 
of Banks for 69 Thai 
Proportion 
of Sample 
Provinces , 
Number of 
Item Errors 
1 Government S avings Bank 1 . 0 0  0 
2 Siam City Bank . 6 1  2 1  
Bangkok Bank of  Commerce 9 
4 Thai Farmers Bank . 2 5 1 8  
5 Siam Commercial Bank . 1 7  4 
6 Bangkok Bank . 1 2 1 1  
7 Bank of  Asia for Industry and Commerce . O S 2 
Number of  cases  : 1 3 8  Coefficient of scalab i lity :  . 6 7  
Provinces discriminated by each of  the above scale s teps are as fo llows : 
7 Chonburi ,  1960 , 1966 ; Nakhon Ratchas ima , 1966 ; Nakhon Srithammarat , 
1960  ; Yala ,  1 96 6 ;  Songkhala , 1960  , 1966  
6 Khonkhaen , 1 96 6 ;  Chiangrai , 1966 ; Chiangmai , 1960 , 1966 ; Trang , 
1966 ; Phitsanulok , 1 9 6 6 ;  Phuket , 1966 ; Lampang , 19 6 0 ,  1966  
5 Chiangrai , 1960 ; Trang , 1960 ; Nakhon Ratchas ima ,  19 6 0 ;  Nakhon Sawan , 
1 96 0 ,  1 96 6 ;  Phetburi , 1 960 , 19 6 6 ;  Udon , 1966  
4 Khonkaen,  1960 ; Chumphon , 1960 , 1966 ; Nakhon Srithammarat , 1966 ; 
Nan , 1 9 6 6 ;  Phang - nga , 1966 ; Phrae , 1966 ; Lopburi , 19 6 6 ;  Suratthani , 
19 6 6 ;  Udon,  1 9 6 0  
3 Chantaburi , 1966 ; Trat , 1 96 6 ;  Nakhon Pathom , 1 9 6 0 ,  1966 ; Nakhon 
Phanom, 1966 ; Nonthaburi ,  1966 ; Nongkhai , 1 9 6 6 ;  Buriram , 1966 ; Pra­
chuap , 1966 ; Phichi t ,  19 6 6 ;  Phetchabun , 1966 ; Yal a ,  1960 ; Ranong , 
1960 , 1966 ; Rayong , 1 96 6 ;  Ratburi , 1960 , 1966 ; Lamphun , 1 96 0 ,  1966 ; 
Samut Songkhrarn , 19 6 6 ;  Sarnut Sakhon, 1 9 6 0 ,  19 6 6 ;  Saraburi , 1966 ; 
Sukhothai , 1 9 6 6 ;  Suphanburi , 1 9 6 6 ;  Surin,  1966 ; Ayuthaya , 1966 ; 
Uttaradi t ,  1966  
2 Krab i ,  1 9 6 0 ,  1966 ; Kanchanaburi ,  1 960 , 1966 ; Chantaburi ,  1960 ; Tak , 
1960 , 1966 ; Narathiwat ,  1960 , 1 9 6 6 ;  Prachinburi , 1960 , 1966 ; Pat­
tani , 1960 , 1 9 6 6 ; Phang- nga , 1 96 0 ;  Phathalung , 19 6 0 ,  1 9 6 6 ;  Rayong , 
1960 ; Lopburi , 1960 ; Sarnut Songkhrarn , 1 960 ; Saraburi , 1960 ; Suphan­
buri , 19 60 ; Suratthani , 1960  
1 Kalas in , 1960 , 1966 ; Kamphaengphe t ,  1 9 6 0 , 1966 ; Chachoengsao , 1 9 60 , 
1 9 6 6 ;  Chainat , 1960 , 19 6 6 ;  Chayaphurn , 1 9 60 , 1 96 6 ;  Trat , 1 960 ; N .  
Nayok , 1960 , 1966 ; N .  Phanom , 1960 ; Nonthaburi ,  1960 ; Nan , 1960 ; 
Nongkhai , 1960 ; Burirarn , 1 96 0 ;  Pathumthani , 1 9 6 0 ,  1 96 6 ;  Prachuap , 
1960 ; Phichit , 1960 ; Phits anulok ,  1960 ; Phetchabun , 1 960 ; Phrae , 
1960 ; Phuket ,  19 60 ; Mahas arakham , 1960 , 1966 ; Maehongson,  1 9 6 0 ,  
1966 ; Roi - e t ,  1960 , 1966 ; Loey , 1960 , 1966 ; Srisaket , 19 6 0 ,  1966 ; 
S .  Nakhon,  1 96 0 ,  1 96 6 ;  Satun , 1960 , 1966 ; S .  Prakan , 19 60 , 19 6 6 ;  
Singburi  , 1960  , 1966  ; Sukhothai , 19 60  ; Surin , 19 6 0 ;  Ayuthaya,  1960  ; 
Angthong , 1960  , 1966  ; Uttaradit  , 1960  ; Uthaithani  , 1 9 6 0 ,  1966  ; Ubon ,  
1 960  , 1 966  
Sources  : Commercial  Directory for Thailand, 1 9 59-1960  and Siam Direc­
tory , 1 9 6 6- 6 7 .  
2 9  
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either one of the banks in a random pattern. This 
probably indicates that at such a relatively low level 
of structural differentiation either a co.mmercial bank 
or an agricultural bank could handle the financial 
business of the province. The twoe·ebanks combined into 
item 2 are the Agricultural Bank, Ltde. and the Siam 
City Bank, Ltd .  while item 3 consists of the Thai 
Farmers Bank, Ltd. and the Bangkok Bank of Commerce, 
Ltd. Another alternative explanation is that these 
banks, as they began to expand in the late fifties, 
may have "divided up" the nation among them so that 
one tended to find only one of the banks in each · 
•
province. 
3. Although it was possible to consetruct scales that in­
cluded a variety.of institutions (banks, occupations, 
theaters, cul tural associations, airports, etc. ), thus 
indicating that they all tap the one dimension of struc­
tural differentiation, certain indices appear to be 
more stable or more reliable than others. Thus, al­
though the presence of a variety of occupations is a 
structural indexe1 6  it is still associated with indi­
viduals in a way that institutions such as banks are 
·not .  Hence occupations are possibly less reliable 
than such more publicly discriminated and immobile in­
stitutions as banks and associations. Moreover, the 
fact that the occupations scales draw their data from 
the much maligned censuses may lessen their reliabil­
itye. 1 7 
I ts use here is merely an elaboration of the commonly held 
belief that if a town has, for example, a doctor, it is 
generally more "developed" than a town of the same size 
that does not possess such an instituetionalized role. 
While the reliability of Thai censuses, and especial ly the 
Census of 1947, has been questioned, we are concerned here 
only with the presence or absence of at least one person
of a particular occupatione. Thus, while one might feel 
unsure of relying on there being exactly seventeen electri­
cians in a particular province in a particular Census, one 
would feel more confident in saying there was at least one 
electrician in the- province. With this approach, even sus­
pect data can be used because not very much is asked of 
theme. In addition, if the data are completely false, there 
wil l be no cumulative, unidimensional pattern underlying
theme. Furthermore, if there is an error in the data, e. g. , 
there was an electerician though none was recorded, this 
will probably appear as an "error" in the scale. If there 
are not too many such omissions, the scale will be largely
unaffectede. (See, e ._g . ,  Saraburi in Table lb where an 
electrician was probably missed by the Census taker. ) 
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4 .  All of the institutions, i. e.e, banks, newspapers, 
hotels, etc. , used as indices are those present in the 
respective provinces and to assume that they all occur 
in the provincial capitals would be a mistake : for 
some provinces the coded institution was present in a 
district and not in the provincial capital; for some 
provinces more than one of the same institutions were 
present. However, the construction of a Guttman scale 
requires the presence of only one of each relevant in­
stitution which means that whether a province has three 
newspapers or one, the institution of "newspapers" is 
coded present (and appears as a " 1" in the scalograms)e. 
The theoretical rationale underlying this is that the 
ability of a province to incorporate one such institu­
tion signifies that a certain level of differentiation 
has been reached, in much the same way as the indige­
nous production of an atomic bomb by a nation intui­
tively conveys something about the level of development 
of that nation. Furthermore, it is assumed that when 
a province has, for example, one agricultural bank, it 
is at the same level of differentiation as a province
with three agricultural banks ; an increase in the num­
ber of the same type of institution merely indicates 
the volume of the activity engaged in, not the diver­
sity of activities. 
5. It is maintained that the cumulative pattern shown by 
the Guttman scales measures the level of "development" 
of the provinces. Many other studies have shown that 
these scales correlate closely with conventional 
measures of development (see the studies cited above)
and indeed, because of their structural nature, the 
scales are a more direct measure of the level of struc­
tural development than are measures that rely on aggre­
gative data dealing with the subunits of the system 
being examined, for example, per capita income or farm 
productivity. However, even if one prefers aggregative 
data, there is no real choice in studies of much of the 
underdeveloped world where many such aggregative sta­
tistics are either non-existent or highly suspecte. 
Much of the discussion of this paper relies upon the scales 
which makes it imperative that their credentials be in good 
order. Table 9 is a tau correlation matrix of the three time 
periods. Since the Guttman scale is an ordinal measure, tau--a 
rank correlation measuree--seems the most appropriate correla­
tional device; it should be remembered that tau has a numeri­
cally lower coefficient for what might be an equivalently strong
Pearsonian r correlation. The concern here is with the inter­
correlations or scales of the same time periods so as to estab­
lish that approximately the same ranking appears for one time 
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Table 9. Rank Correlation Matrices of Structural Differentia­
tion, 1947, 1960, and 1966  
1947 Measures 
1 2 
1 Combined Occupation,
1947 (Table 3) X 
2 Occupations, 1947 
(Table 1) X 
1960 Measures 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 
2 
·3 
4 
5 
Combined Occupation,
1960 (Table 3) 
Banks, 1960 
(Table 4) 
Combined Banks, 
1960 (Table 8) 
Banks and Occupations,
1960 (Table 5) 
Occupations, 1960 
(Table 2) 
X 
t. 2 3 
X 
. z est 
. 7 St 
X 
. 18* 
. 8st 
. 70 t 
X 
. 2 3t 
. 33t 
. 33t 
46 t .e
X 
1966  Measures 
1 2 3 
1 
2 
3 
Banks, 1966  
(Table 6) 
Combined Banks, 
1966  (Table 8) 
Banks and Other 
1966  (Table 7) 
Institutions, 
X . s est 
X 
. _40 t 
. 60 t 
X 
* Significant at the . O S  level. 
t Significant at the . 01 levele. 
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period no matter which indices are used. An examination of the 
matrix reveals that all the coefficients except one are signifi­
cant at the . 01 levele. The one that is significant only at the 
. O S  level is the correlation of the Combined Occupatione, 1960e, 
and Banks and Occupations, 1960 scales. It is of interest to 
note that this and the other relatively low coefficients deal 
with occupation scales and this tends to bear out the observa­
tion made above regarding the possibly lower reliability of 
occupations as an index. In addition, the varying intercorrela­
tions may be due to the different distributions of cases in the 
different scales. An examination of the cumulative percentages
indicates that some of the scales discriminate finely at the 
lower end and group the more differentiated provinces together 
at the top; some do vice versa.e1 8  
Thuse, we may conclude that despite the difference in insti­
tutional sectors--banks, theaters, newspapers, airportse, occupa­
tions, hotels, organizations--there are basic rankings of 
provinces that emerge for each time period, and it is upon these 
rankings that we shall base our analysise. 
Correlates of Structural Differentiation 
To substantiate the earlier contention that if differentia­
tion were truly structural it should manifest itself through 
measures other than the Guttman scales, the following correlates 
were testede. 
Number of Districts 
The province is composed of districtse, each one of which 
constitutes a subsystem and which has interests and demands that 
must be dealt with by the provincial system. Thuse, one might
consider a province with more districts to have a more differen­
tiated structure-- a  structure with many interrelated parts and 
one in which a proliferation of interests rather than a mono­
lithic unit prevailse. The hypothesized positive relationship 
between number of districts and structural differentiation was 
supported by the following correlationse: number of districts 
in 1960 correlated positively with the Banks, 1960 scale at . 19* 
(tau)e, with the Occupatione, 1960 scale at . z st  and with the 
Combined Occupation and Bank, 1960 scale at . 14 .  While some of 
this relationship may be due to larger and more populous prov­
inces having more districts this does not explain the whole 
correlatione, for there is not a perfect relationship between 
18 . We are indebted to Carol Owen for this suggestione. 
3 3  
number of distri cts and population or areae. Area correlates 
with number of districts in 1960 at . 4ot while populatiori corre­
lates with number of districts at . s9t.e1 9  However, here one 
might well ask what role population plays in development. 
Population and Size 
Do numbers cause or reflect development? If it is a cause 
or reflection of development then India should be well on the 
way to economic take-off. Or are people merely attracted to 
those places that are already growing economically, in the way 
that a boom town grows? These are questions that can only be 
touched on in this paper. Population size does correlate with 
differentiation rank, but not as highly as some might expect. 
Population in 1960 correlates . 16* with the Bank, 1960 scale, 
. 13 with the Bank and Occupation, 1960 scale, and . 21t  with the 
Occupation, 1960 scale. These correlations are not particularly
high and this indicates that one can easily have the case of two 
provinces with the same population but with one havirig much more 
differentiated economic, social, educational, etc. ,· sectors of 
public life than the other. With this in mind, one can see why
a structural approach is stressed here and measures that involve 
the aggregation of subunits avoided. The relationship to the 
larger unit of aggregate measures, such as population, is both 
indirect and problematic. The further study of this relation­
ship, pertinent though it is to conventional studies of develop­
ment, must be left to a later study. 
Number of Municipalities2 0  
Returning to the examination of structural correlates of 
differentiation, an analeogous argument to that made for taking 
the number of districts as a measure of differentiation could 
be made for regarding the number of municipalities in the same 
light. Several municipalities spread throughout a province 
might be regarded as evidence that the provincial structure was 
one in which a variety of viewpoints--emanating from different 
centers, each with its own interests-- were being dealt with. 
19.  Since area, number of districts and population are all 
interval data, the Pearsonian r is also appropriate and 
these two correlations using r, are . 61t  and . 1 st, respec­
tively, thus showing that numerically lower correlation 
coefficients are obtained from the same data when tau is 
used. 
20. Municipalities are established on the basis of population, 
revenues collected, and whether or not a town is an admin­
istrative seat. 
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The number of municipalities in 1960 ( Thai land Population Census, 
1 9 60) correlates at . z st with the Banks , 1960 scale , at . 23t 
with the Banks and Occupations , 1960 scale , and at . 2 6t with 
the Occupations , 1960 scalee. 
Percentage of Population in Agriculture 
A final , though crudee, correlate of structural differentia­
tion is percentage of population employed in agriculturee. A 
more differentiated structure should have fewer people employed 
in agriculture and a greater proportion of people employed in 
other occupations and activitiese. Percentage of people employed 
in agriculture ( Thai land Population Census, 1 9 60)  , as predictede, 
correlates negatively with the Banks , 1960 scale at - . 2 3t ,  with 
the Banks and Occupations , 1960 scale at - . 17* , and with the 
Occupations , 1960 scale at - .04  . .  That the latter correlation 
is not very strong may be attributed to the above-mentioned 
reservations as to the reliability of occupations as a struc­
tural measure when compared to more "permanent" and more pub­
licly discriminated institutions such as bankse. 
Relative Rates of Structural Growth 
The relative rates of provincial structural growth were 
quantified by measuring relative change in scale rank in the 
following mannere. Two scales were takene, each from a different 
time period , for example 1947 and 1960e. Then provinces on the 
same scale step in 1947 were compared to determine their posi­
tions on the 1960 scale relative to one anothere. The modal 
behavior was established by determining where the majeority of 
provinces ended up on the 1960 scale and all of these were given 
a score of "3"e, midway between 1 and 5 .  Then those provinces
that ranked higher than the modal pattern were divided into two 
equal parts , the high half being given a score of "5",  the lower 
half a score of "4". For those that fell below the modal pat­
terne, the same procedure was takene. Those that ended up on the 
1960 scale at a point below the mode were divided into those 
which differentiated at a very slow rate and were scored "l , "  and 
those which differentiated at a less slow rate and were scored 
"2". Then the scores on all pairs of scales were summed , a pro­
cedure that averages the differentially sensitive scalese. This 
technique controls for the previous position of a provincee. 
The scores listed in Table 10 were obtained by combining the 
growth rates from each of the 1947 scales to each of the 1960 
ones , and each of the 1960 scales to each of the 1966 ones. 
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24  34 
51 2 9  
41 
42  
32  
41 
4 5  40 
24  
35 
30 
46 
41 
5 6  
47 
29  
5 6  
31 
4 2  
52 2 9  
35 
Table 10. Scores.eof the 69 Provinces for 1947-1960 and 
1960-1966, Based on the 8 Scales* 
Total Score Total ScoreProvince 1947-1960 1960-1966 
Krabi, S 29 37 
Kanchanaburi, C 3 4  2 8  
Kalasin, NE 
Kamphaengphet, N 
Khonkaen, NE 
_ t  4 5  
5837 
Chantaburi, C 
73
Chachoengsao, C 33 
Chonburi, C 39 
34 36 
46
Chainat, C 
Chayaphum, NE 
Chumphon, S 36  
Chiangrai, N 37 59 
6 236NChiangmai,
Trang, S 42  5 8  
Trat, C 23 5 5  
Tak, N 2 8  3 3  
2 1Nakhon Nayok, C · 
Nakhon Pathom, C 
Nakhon Phanom, NE 60 
74Nakhon Ratchasima, NE 
Srithammarat, 
35 
Nakhon S 52  
6 2Nakhon Sawan, N 
Nonthaburi, C 
Narathiwat, S 
13 
33 
Nan, N 19 
Nongkhai, NE 
Buriram, 
33 
NE 5 5  
24  
33 
Pathumthani, C 21  
2 5Prachuap, C 
Prachinburi, C 
37 
2 8  
Pattani, S 3 4  
Phang-nga, S 2 9  
40SPhathalung,
Phichit, N 2 8  51 
6524Phitsanulok, N 
Phetchabun, N 
Phetburi, C 41 
* An average or modal 
1960 would be 30, 
rate of structural growth between 1947 and 
and between 1960 and 1966 would be 45. The 
lettere(s) after the name of the province indicates the region
in which the province is locatede. 
t Kalasin is the province that was created during the 1947-1960 
period � 
3 6  
2 7  
13 
4 5  
29 
3 6  
2 8  
23 
30 
30 
30 2 6  
32 3 3  
37 
33 
31 
30 
3 2  
30 
2 2  
31 
2 8  
31  
4 8  3 5  
52  17 
2 6  
6 2  43  
28  5 8  
39  
3 4  44 
Table 10 (continued) 
Total Score Total ScoreProvince 1947-1960 1960-1966 
6 2Phrae, N 
Phuket, S 37 60 
30 
35 
25 
Mahasarakham, NE 
Maehongson, N 
Yala, S 
Roi-et, NE 
3 5  73 
• 
2 8  
Ranong, S 
Rayong, 
4 8  
47C 
CRatburi, so  
51Lopburi, C 
Lampang,
Lamphun, 
N 5 2  
N 36 
Loey, NE 
Srisaket, NE 
40Sakon Nakhon, NE 24 
Songkhala, S 73 
Satun, S 
Samut Prakan, C 
3 4  
32 
32  
40Samut Songkhram, C 
Samut Sakhon, C 
Saraburi, C 55 
35Singburi, C 
Sukhothai, N 5 4  
5 2Suphanburi, C 
49Suratthani, S 
Surin, NE 
Ayuthaya, C 
Angthong, 30C 
Udon, NE 
Uttaradit, N 
Uthaithani, C 24 
Ubon, NE 
The patterning of the relative rates of growth can be seen 
in the inserted mape. This map shows that many of the prov­
inces of central Thailand have not been differentiating at the 
speed of many provinces in other regions,e2 1 and that there are 
21e. The rate of structural differentiation for many of the 
provinces of the Northeast has been quite astounding. 
These structural changes are reflected in other spheres 
than the "institutions" that made up the scales; e. g. , Bell 
(1969 : 48) notes that "for the northeast, the following 
• 
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"natural" regions that do not coincide with the four accepted
administrative regions of North, South, Northeast and Central. 
Further confirmation of certain provinces having structur­
ally differentiated at a faster rate than others may be found 
by examining those provinces that gained new districts ( Statis­
tical Abs tracts, 1966:e5-6) between 1960 and 1966. There is low 
but positive correlation of . 10 between an increase in the num­
ber of districts in a province and its rate of structural 
growth in the period 1960-1966, indicating that not only insti­
tutions but also the structure itself differentiates in this 
process.e2 2  
At this point some general comments on the regional pat­
terning of structural differentiation are pertinent. It appears 
that the commanding position held by many of the central prov­
inces, particularly in 1947, was considerably eroded by 1966e. 
While the provinces of the central region have increased their 
level of structural differentiation during the period. under con­
sideration, many of the northern, northeastern and southerne. 
provinces have differentiated at a faster rat� and have ''caught 
up" to many of the central provinces. It also appears that 
"regions" designated as North, Northeast, South and Central are 
political, geographic, ethnic or linguistic units that often 
bear little relationship to the regions delineated by the scales 
in terms of the level of structural differentiation. A study
looking into this question may provide a basis for a better 
analysis of regionalism within the Thai context. 
An indicator of the regional trends of structural differ­
entiation is the growth of existing municipalities. There 
appear to be two conflicting dynamics within the structural 
pattern of Thailande' s  urban networke. On the one hand, Bangkok 
crops increased their production (in tons) as indicated: 
cassava from 7,000 in 1957 to 167,000 in 1965; maize from 
11,000 in 1950 to 69,000 in 1965; kenaf from 4, 600 in 1950 
to 520,000 [ ! ]  in 1965; j ute from 326 in 1950 to 2,000 in 
1965; kapok and bambax from 91,000 in 1950 to 145,000 in 
1966," suggesting that in the agricultural sphere there 
has been profound structural change and developmente. 
22. At a higher system level--that of the region--it might be 
noted that during the period under consideration the only
region to gain a province, that is, to have an increase in 
the differentiation of its structure, was the Northeast 
where the province of Kalasin was created in October, 1947. 
More recently still another province was added to the 
Northeast when Yasothon was carved out of Ubol province. 
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is accentuating its position of primate domination � Sidney
Goldstein (1969b : 136-137) points out that "in 1947, Greater 
Bangkok's urban population was already 21 times greater than 
that of the next largest place, Chiengmai ; by 1967 it was 32 
times greater . "  Furthermore, "of 2,177 new industries estab­
lished in Thailand during 19 68, 1,127, more than half, were in 
the metropolitan Bangkok area" (ibid.e: 1 53) which shows that 
Bangkok's dominance is due to more than mere numbers but also 
exists in terms of economic preponderance. 
On the other hand, Goldstein has collected data indicating
that the outer regions are actually undergoing profound struc­
tural change in their urban patternse. He shows that while in 
1947 five out of ten largest urban places were located in the 
central region, by 1 9 67 only two out of the top ten were in 
this region. Over the same period, the North increased its 
share of the top ten from two to three, as did the South, and 
the Northeast from one to two (ibid. : 148)e. Goldsetein notese: 
No doubt, the rapid growth of both Udorn and Korat 
are related to the location at these places of Ameri­
can airbases, but the fact that other places far re­
moved from this type of influence (for example Haad 
Yai [in the South] ) also are characterized by high
growth rate suggests that the momentum of urbanization 
operates with considerable independence of this type
of catalyst and can be expected to continue even after 
removal of the airbases. (1969a :  9) 
Further data collected by Goldstein support the view that 
these growing urban centers in the outer regions are not iso­
lated cities but rather are the most visible evidence of growing 
urban networks of second-order cities and towns in those regionse. 
His data indicate that the number of cities in the middle range,
that is, with populations over 20, 000 but smaller than Bangkok,
have generally increased greatly in the outer regions. Thus,
during the 1947-19 67 period the increase in the percentage of 
municipalities of this size in the central region was 25. 3 while 
it was 28.4 in the Northeast, 11e.8  in the North, and 36. 0 in 
the South (1 9 69b:142)e. In the range of cities with populations 
over 40, 000 but still smaller than Bangkok, the percentage ·in­
crease during the same period was 2. 1 in the central region,
9 . 6  in the Northeast, 11.6 in the North, and 8 . 0 in the South. 
This process may be viewed as a further confirmation that the 
outer regions have been differentiating (both in terms of their 
institutional complexity and in terms of their urban networks) 
at a faster rate than the central region.e2 3  
23. This relationship between a more rank-size distribution of 
cities, that is, a more differentiated urban network, and 
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In this connection it must be remembered that Bangkok is 
not included among the sixtye-nine provincese. Thus it is possi­
ble that because the provinces of the Central Plains are so 
close to, and therefore very dominated by, Bangkok they are 
relying--to an extent greater than the other regions--on the 
very high institutional complexity of the national capital.
Rather like suburbs in relation to a city, the provinces adjea­
cent to Bangkok do not need to build up a network of institu­
tions as do the provinces in the North, South, and Northeast 
which, as will be shown later, may be developing _eautonomously 
as a reaction against the domination of Bangkoke. 
One should not conclude that structural differentiation 
declined in regard to the provinces of central Thailande. These 
provinces merely did not grow as fast as those in the other 
regions ; they are still generally more differentiated than the 
otherse. However, many of the provinces of the other regions 
seem to have overtaken provinces of the central regione. Al­
though the disparity between the regions appears to be less 
than in earlier periods, this is not to maintain the provinces
in any way approached the extremely highe--relative to the rest 
of Thailand--level of structural differentiation of Bangkok. 
In addition, we must stress that we have not investigated the 
relationship between the structural differentiation of the 
province and income and production levels of sub-units such as 
farms, peasants and workerse. There is no assumption being made 
here that an increase in structural differentiation of a prove­
ince necessarily leads to an increase in general income levels 
at an individual levele. This, however, is an area that deserves 
investigatione. 
structural development, has been found in a study of struc­
tural change in Israel from 1931 to 1967 (D . H .  K .  Amiran 
and A .  Shahar, 1969:30-33) and in a cross-national study
of primacy (Carol Owen and Ronald Witton, 1970). 
PART II 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF RATES OF STRUCTURAL GROWTH 
TO SOCIO-POLITICAL CONFLICT 
The second part of this paper is an analysis of the conse­
quences and correlates of structural growth patterns. While 
these patterns and our findings will require deeper study, they 
are offered as an example of the type of analysis that the first 
part of the paper allows one to proceed to. In addition, it 
will be suggested that present approaches to counterinsurgency 
in Thailand are destined to be unsuccessful because they are 
based on the questionable assumption that poverty breeds favor­
able conditions for insurrection. The findings presented here 
point towards more responsive government and greater regional 
autonomy as appropriate measures to reduce regional discontent; 
suppressive activities carried on by police with only token wel­
fare attempts by the Government will merely cause further dis­
content. 
The Dynamics of Structural Growth 
What exactly does a rapid rate of structural growth entail? 
It can be hypothesized that it requires a province to unite in 
order to increase its relative centrality, that is, to better 
its position with regard to access to the information flows 
within the regional or national system. This, of course, has 
two parts to it. First, the province must be able to present a 
"united front" to the larger system of which it is a subsystem
and, second, the larger system has to allow it to reorganize 
the information flow within the system and upset established 
relationships. 
The first hypothesis, that of the need for a united front, 
can be tested by using the 1957 voting returns ( Bangkok  Post , 
December 16-20, 1957)e. If a region were about to unite and in­
�rease its relative centrality by opposing the larger system 
and its established relations, one would expect this mobiliza­
tion to be reflected in a lessened tendency for splinter parties 
to arisee. Rather, the emergence of a consolidated political
grouping to carry the unified demands is to be expected. This 
appears to be the case, for there is a negative relationship of 
-.24t between (a) the ratio, in 1957, of the number of different 
parties represented in each province among the elected represen­
tatives in each province, to the number of parliamentary repre­
sentatives allotted the province, and (b) the relative provincial 
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growth rate in the 1960-1966 periode. This unity may already 
have been present earlier because the correlation of the above 
ratio with the 1947-1960  growth rate was also negative, although
lower: - � 1 5 . Thus, this may indicate that such consolidation 
is a necessary precondition for such a "push . "  
With the election results of 1969 ( Bangko k Pos t ,  February
13, 1969), we find the expected negative correlations: the 
correlation between the ratio of parties represented/number of 
representatives allotted (for each province), and the 1947-1960 
growth rate was - .·10 ; the correlation between this ratio and 
the 1960 -1966 growth rate was - . 18*e. These rather low figures 
· may mean either of several things : (1) growth in the period
before 1960 was- progressing rather satisfactorily ; (2) relative 
centrality had been increased ; (3) the greater proliferation of 
parties is simply another index of differentiation ; (4) there 
is a tendency for Thai politicians to run independently and the 
voters to vote for them (which results in many "parties,e" which 
in turn gives us a high ratio which lowers the correlations)e. 
The second element to be considered is the degree to which 
the larger system will allow a subsystem such as a province to 
rearrange the nation ' s  intersystem relationshipse. The extreme 
degree of Bangkok ' s  primacy noted earlier should be stressed . 
Thus, to rearrange the national system would mean, in effect, 
to challenge Bangkok either in parliamentary terms or through
dissident regional, provincial and other subsystem movementse. 
The latter form of challenge may underlie the regional dissatis­
faction suffered recently by Thailand- and which · Keyes ( 1967a) 
has documented for the Northeaste. One should note, however, 
that Bangkok has resisted such challenges and has attempted to 
maintain "bureaucratic centrality" ( Keyes, 1967a : 39). 
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The Expression of Regional Dissatisfaction 
In trying to identify evidence of these structural chal­
lenges to the established system and then to investigate their 
relationship to structural growth we note that these challenges 
can come through legitimate channels, that is, in the political 
arenae. If these channels are inadequate to cope with such 
expression or are nonexistent, then the province or region may
communeicate its desire to rearrange the system through such 
"illegitimate" means as social conflict . Such an inadequacy 
does exist and stems from the inability of the Thai political 
arena to handle these types of expressione. For example, Wilson 
(196 2: 216- 217) claims: 
The limits of the public opinion voiced by the national 
assembly are dependent upon the extent to which thee. 
members represent in themselves a social cross-section. 
4 2  
[However] a great part of the country ' s  population 
goes wholly unrepresented by this system because 
assembly members are not part of the maj ority of 
people who elect them and these interests and aspira­
tions, whatever they may be, are unexpressed. The 
bulk of the farm population is not represented by 
individual members. . . .  
The inability of legitimate channels to handle regionalism 
and subsystem discontent is well-documented in Keyese' study
( 1967a : 5 5) :  
No provision exists for the expression of legitimate 
regional grievances, and desires cannot be expressed
through any existing group of political representa­
tives sanctioned by the central government. 
We shall try to add to Keyes' descriptive analysis by showing 
that there are quantitative measures that can tap these phenom­
ena. 
One possible outlet of regional and provincial dissatisfac­
tion with Bangkoke' s  control of the national system is through 
the recent elections. Evidence of an antie-government (Bangkok) 
element in voting may be measured crudely by taking a vote 
against the UTPP (United Thai Peoplee' s  Party) as a vote against
the Government and against Bangkoke' s  dominance. There are 
correlations in the predicted direction between the ratio of 
UTPP representatives elected to total provincial representatives 
in 1960 and the provincial growth rates of 1947-1960 (- .e18*), 
1947-1966 ( - . 1 1), and 1960-1966 (-.04), but they are negligible.
Such results may indicate several things. First, more than 
anti-Bangkok feeling is contained in a non-UTPP vote and hence 
the weak relationship in the predicted direction. Second, the 
UTPP vote reflects the popularity of the elected representatives
and confirms the tactic of the UTPP of accepting only candidates 
that showed a high probability of being elected. Third, Keyes 
has pointed out, in regard to the earlier parliamentary period, 
that the political system has shown itself to be unresponsive 
to regional demands and to be unable to serve as a vehicle for 
such demands. The voters may have realized this. With the con­
trol over the political system by Bangkok, it may be that oppo­
sition has sought other channels of expression. Such evidence 
may be seen in the rise of explicit socio-political conflict 
and terrorism directed against the center and its representa­
tives, and in the fact that this conflict has followed the frus­
tration of earlier efforts in the formal political arena .e2 � 
2 4e. This "frustration" not only included an unresponsiveness
to regional demands but even extended to outright suppres-
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This growth of an alternative outlet for political expression 
is to be expected in a primate nation such as Thailand where 
the political apparatus is so heavily controlled and dominated 
by the capital . 
The presence of socio-political conflict was determined by
noting explicit reporting of "communist terrorist,e" "guerrilla" 
or "Thailand United Patriotic Front" activities which have been 
growing steadily in volume since the early sixtiese. That this 
guerrilla activity is political in nature is recognized by the 
Government and the mass media ; data gathered are those identi­
fied as such activity by the Governmente. 
Those provinces that have had terrorist and insurrection­
ist activity fall into two groupse. There are thirty-three
provinces in which acts of terrorism have been reported in our 
survey of the Thai and U . S .  presse. Of these thirty-three,
twenty-five provinces2 5  had terrorism serious enough, or were 
potentially "sensitive" enough, to warrant the Thai Ministry of 
Defense cooperating with the Ministry of Interior in placing 
army officers as Deputy Governors to oversee counterinsurgency
operations within each of these provinces ( Bangkok Daily News 
Digest  , October 1 6, 1967) : 
In the face of intensified Communist terrorist activi­
ties, the Ministry of the Interior requested the 
Defense Ministry to assign army officers of a full 
colonel rank to serve as advisers to the Provincial 
governors of 25 provinces where terrorists are activee. 
Later in the year, Prachuap was added to these twenty-five prove­
inces when it was placed under martial law because of terrorist 
activities ( New York Times ,  December 2, 1967) . 
sion and assassination of regional parliamentary leaderse. 
See, for example,e· Keyes (1967a : 34) .  There are growing
indications that there was a movement from the formal 
political arena to overt terrorism and guerrilla activi­
ties. See, for example, the report in the New York Times 
of June 3, 1961, of thee_eexecution for guerrilla activities 
of two former members of the national legislaturee. 
25e. The twenty-five provinces were Trang, Nakhon Srithammarat, 
Sakon Nakhon, Loey, Suphanburi, Roi-et, Phattalung, Phetcha­
bun, Phetburi, Ratburi, Nakhon Phanom, Kanchanaburi, Kala­
sin, Srisaket, Narathiwat, Buriram, Nan, Satun, Ubon, Sura­
thani, Chayabphum, Chiangrai, Udon, Nongkhai, and Yala 
(Bangkok Daily News Digest , October 16, 1967)e. The remain­
ing eight provinces were Chachoengsao, Pattani, Surin, 
Nakhon Ratchasima, Chiangmai, Songkhla, Phitsanuloke and 
Prachuap. 
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The Test of the Hypothesis 
Table 11 shows the relationship of the incidence of terror­
ism to the rate of structural growth between 1947 and 1966. The 
overall rate of structural growth was obtained by comparing the 
rates of structural growth in the 1947-1960 and the 1960-1966 
periods. Those provinces that were "High" in both periods were 
given a ranking of "High" in Table 11. Those that were con­
sistently "Low" in both periods were given a ranking of "Low.e" 
Those that were "High" in one period and "Low" in the other 
were placed in the "Medium" category.e2 6  
As can be seen from Table 11, there appears to be an excep­
tionally strong association between the two phenomena of rate 
of structural growth and incidence of terrorist activities.e2 7  
This relationship is especially strong among the twenty-six
provinces that have attracted the particular attention of the 
Thai government, for there is a difference of 30 percentage 
points between the "Low" and "High" structural growth categories. 
However, the association also exists among the seven provinces 
from which there have been reports of terrorist activity. 
Table 11, which shows that guerrilla and terrorist activity 
are closely associated with structural changes within Thailand, 
suggests that if Communist agitators are infiltrating from 
across Thailand's borders--as the United States and Thai govern­
ments maintain--and are "causing" anti-government activity, then 
26. An alternative ranking system was also computed. This in­
volved adding the 1947-1960 growth rate score of each prov­
ince to its 1960-1966 growth rate score (see Table 10)e, 
thus producing a score for the overall period. The possie­
ble scores ranged from 25 to 125, and these were divided 
into the following categories : "Low" (scores 25-59) ; 
"Medi urn" (s co res 6 0 -9 0 ) ; and "High" ( s core s 91 -1 25) . Vi r -
tually the same results as those presented in Table 11 
emerged. The fact that the greatest proportion of prov­
inces fall in the "Medium" category is a result of deter­
mining the relative rate of growth of each province in 
terms of the modal pattern of provinces, this modal or 
most common pattern then being classed as "Medium.e" How­
ever, it is also probably a true representation of reality 
for most provinces probably did not have an "average" rate 
of growth. 
27. A visual representation of this association is provided by 
the inserted map, which also points toward the existence 
of "natural regions" that overlap and divide the present
four administrative regions of Thailand. 
� 
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Table 11 
Relationship of Rate of Structural Growth (1947-1966) to Incidence of 
Incidence 
of 
Terrorist 
Activity 
-
Terrorist Activity for 69 Thai Provinces 
Deputy
Governor 
For 
Terrorism 
Terrorism 
R.eported 
No 
Terrorism 
Reported 
Rate of Structural Growth, 1947-1966 
Low 
' 1 7 %  
" 1 7 %  
0 %  
' 
83% 
-(n 1 2 )  
Medium 
.
40% 
48% 
8 %  , 
53% 
-(n 40) 
High 
.
47%  
� 7 1 %  
24%  • 
29% 
- 1 7 )  
4 6  
these "subvers  ives" are having the most success in those  areas 
that have experienced an above average rate of structural growth 
- - areas , it is  hypothes i zed here , whi ch have found difficulty 
in expanding within the present national system . That the ter ­
rorism has occurred after the structural growth had occurred i s  
indicated not only b y  the increas ing number of provinces that 
had such activity during the mid - s ixties  , but also  by an in­
creas  ing activity in those  areas that have had terrorist activ­
ity s ince the very early s ixties .  For examp l e ,  i.t is  reported 
in the New York Times (December 10 , 1967  : 50) that in the 
Northeast the annual number of "clashes" b etween guerri l las and 
the Thai pol ice and army rose from 20 in 196 5 , to 297  in 196 7 .  
This interpretation s ees  a rigidity in the Thai national 
system , parti cularly in the way that the nation is centered 
around Bangkok , that creates a barrier to the integration and 
accommodation of rap idly develop ing centers and regions . Tha i ­
l and , with the most primate capital i n  the world ,  appears as a 
nation wherein there is  a complete lack of g ive - and-take between 
competing regional centers  . Lack of such a process is  a good 
index of structural rigidity ,  and it is probab le that the center 
would react against any regional movement making cl aims on it 
and on the system as a who le . As Keyes puts it for the North­
east: 
The Thai government' s  attitude towards any political 
oppos ition in the Northe ast has been to treat it as 
insurrection activity . (196 7 a :  5 5 )  
When one notes the fact that our correl ation between rate 
of structural differentiation and political conf l i ct refers to 
the whole  of Thai l and and that the Northeast was not the only 
region to have such conflict ,  then one must seriously examine 
those  theories that s eek to exp l ain conflict in the Northeast 
in terms of idiosyncratic factors at work there  . The tentative 
explanation advanced here , that socio-political confl i ct is  the 
result of fast-growing provinces encountering rigidity in the 
national system , is  one that is  app l i cab le  to provinces in all  
the regions of  Thailand . In  particular  , the view generally held 
by the Thai and United States Governments ( s ee below) that it is 
"poor" areas where conflict occurs , does not explain why there 
are many "poor" areas whi ch have seen no s ign of po l itical con­
fl ict.  Indeed , to uphold the hypothesis that po l itical confl i ct 
and terrorism occur in poor areas one would need to estab l i s h  a 
negative relationship b etween structural differentiation and 
social  confl ict,  whereas Table 12 shows there is  in fact a pos i ­
tive relationship . 2 e  
28.  In Table  12 the provinces were ranked "High , "  "Medium , "  and 
"Low" by averaging their pos itions on the three 1966 s cales 
of structural differentiation (Tab les 6 ,  7 ,  and 8) . 
40) 17) 
Table 12 
Relationshi� of Level of Structural Differentiation (1966) to 
Incidence of Terrorist Activity for 69 Thai Provinces 
Incidence 
of 
Terrorist 
Activity 
-
D·eputy
Governor 
For 
Terrorism 
Terrorism 
Reported 
No 
Terrorism 
Level 
Low 
41 % 
• 
� 41 % 
0 %  , 
59% 
of Structural Growth, 1966 
Medium 
27% 
• 
• 41 % 
14%  • 
59% 
High 
.
44% 
- 60 % 
16%  
; 
40 % 
Reported - (n(n 12) - . (n -
4 8  
However, even the slightly positive relationship in Table 
12 (which relies heavily- -in a way that Table 11 does not--on 
the seven cases in the "Terrorism Reported" category) might be 
a spurious one : as we have shown, those provinces that have 
had terrorism have been those that have generally shown an above 
average rate of structural growth between 1947 and 1966, and 
hence one would expect there to be a relationship between inci­
dence of terrorism and level of structural differentiation by
1966. However, there certainly is not the negative relationship 
that would show terrorism occurring in "poor" areas. Once again 
we must stress that we are not saying that these areas are 
"rich," but rather that they have a relatively high institu­
tional complexitye.e2 9  
The Presence of Minorities 
One final area crucial in this context is the position of 
minorities within Thailand and their relationship to the struc­
tural patterns earlier examined. It could be that domination 
by Bangkok might be felt all the more keenly by those who do 
not see Bangkok as the center of their cultural and religious 
world, and who regard Bangkok officials as being unsympathetic 
to local interests. According to one report, 
A provincial governor in the north admitted recently
that officials sent into his province to deal with the 
tribes had failed to understand their problems • . . .  
(New York Times  , April 14, 1969: 14) 
This lack of understanding on the part of Bangkok results in 
policies that only aggravate conditions : the report continued 
by noting the use of napalm against dissident Meo tribesmen. 
King Bhumipol, obviously concerned about the danger of using
insensitive repression, was quotede: 
There are very few Meos who are Reds. If we make mis­
takes, the whole Meo tribe will turn Red and cause 
incessant trouble for us later. 
It is significant that the Meos, far from being poor and back­
ward, have for some time now been producing opium as a lucrative 
29. "Poor'' and "rich" are particularly inadequate terms, for 
even if one had reliable per capita income figures, these 
would tell one �othing about the actual distribution of 
wealth, and then if one did have information about distri­
bution, one would have to relate individual-level wealth 
to provincial-level development, a relationship which need 
not necessarily be direct. 
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cash crop, and have trade links outside their villages. One 
indication of this is obtained from the observation made of a 
Meo village near Fang in the North:e3 0  
. . e• in hand with Fang's hidden traffic [in opium]
is a modest economic boom that is gradually making an 
easy life of the areae' s  Thai farmers and merchants 
even brighter • . e• .  Fang's. 3, 000 inhabitants are en­
joying a good market for their teak, rice, vegetables 
and silver. ( New York Times, August 1, 196 5: 8) 
In this context one can imagine that the Thai Government's 
efforts to stamp out the opium trade and the slash and burn 
agricultural techniques of many of the tribes have met with 
strong opposition ,e3 1  and its response has often been insensi­
tive to local conditions. "More often than not, the [ Thai] 
Government has met the challenge [of the Meo and Yao] with a 
heavye-handed conventional response that has caused more prob­
lems that it solves'' ( New York Times , May 5, 1968: 3) . 
The minorities question is also relevant to the Muslims in 
the South where Chinese terrorists of the Malayan Communist 
Party ."have organized a Communist front" and have found increas­
ing support among the Thai Malays who "speak Malay rather than 
Thai and have little affection for the Buddhist government in 
Bangkok, by playing upon their anti-Thai nationalist and reli­
gious sentiment. The new approach is similar to one that the 
Communists are attempting to use in northeast Thailand [among 
the Lao ]"  (New York Times , October 2, 196 8 ; January 5, 1964: 4)e. 
The Bangkok government constantly refers to "all members of the 
Moslem religion who are Thai citizens, as ' Thai Islam,e' in 
order to stress the unity of the nation regardless of ethnic 
group ore.ereligion" ( U . S . Army Handbook for Thailand : 57) . In 
30. A future study might well look into the contribution made 
to the overall economic development of provinces by minori­
ties. For example, many of the reported 45,000 Vietnamese 
living in Thailand have built up prosperous businesses and 
farms. New York Times , March 15, 1969. 
31e. "The position of these tribes is complicated by the fact 
that opium growing and the type of agriculture used here, 
in which valuable forest land is purposely devastated by
fire every year to create new fields for the roving farm­
ers, are both illegal in Thailand. This makes the tribes­
men technically outlaws and adds to their traditional 
suspicion of the Thai Government." New York Times , May 21, 
1963: 2 1 .  A later New York Times report points out that 
not only the Meo were growing opium as a cash crop, but 
also the Yao and Akha hill tribes (March 20, 196 7)e. 
so 
its attempt to foster a feeling of nationhood among all the 
diverse and far-flung minorities, the Thai government "has em­
ployed the prestige of the highly respected King Poumipon to 
help build the government ' s  image in the remote areas" ( Neuchter­
lein, 1967 : 1 28). This may have minimal effect in areas that 
do not see the King as a religious and cultural leader, who may
instead be associated in their minds with resented Bangkok offi­
cials. Braestrup, describing the Thailand Patriotic Fronte' s  
activities in a village in a remote area of Thailand notese: 
The farmers of Koh Noi later showed no resentmente-­
even a sly grin or two- -when they recalled the Front 
oratore' s  diatribe against the high and mighty in 
faraway Bangkok • 
• • . And simply by challenging the faraway Thanem 
Government, they [the Front] have attracted a certain 
following among the restless and dissatisfied. ( 1967 : 
31 , 52) 
The effect of controlling for the presence of minorities3 2  
on the association between rate of structural growth and terrore­
ist activities is shown in Table 1 3 .  As can be seen, the pres­
ence of minorities has a separate and additive effect throughout
the relationship, particularly at higher rates of structural 
growth. This supports the tentative hypothesis that minorities 
might be particularly sensitive to Bangkok control under condi­
tions of rapid structural growth. This, however, needs to be 
further examined for we did not have information as to whether 
the terrorism was carried out by the minorities in the provinces
concerned and we certainly have not explored in any great detail 
the relationship between minorities and the rate of structural 
growth. 
Implications of the Findings 
Returning now to the earlier discussion we stress two 
points: ( 1 )  there has been explicit and overt political opposi­
tion in the form of terrorism and insurrection throughout Thai­
land, and ( 2 )  this interpretation of the aforementioned activity
has been accepted by the Government and the mass media which in 
their reporting of it have distinguished it from banditry. It 
is curious that even an expert on Thailand such as Wilson should 
choose to ignore this explicit political opposition being 
32 . In Table 13, a province was coded as having a minority if 
it was shown to have a non-Thai speaking group on the map
• 
1n Figure 8 (Distribution of Linguistic Groups in Thailand)
of the U . S .  APmy Handbook fop Thailand. 
Table 13  
The Relationship of Rate of Structural Growth (1947-1966) to Incidence 
of Terrorist Activity, Controlling for Presence of Minorities, 
for 69  Thai Provinces 
Rate of Structural Growth, 1 9 47- 1966  
Incidence 
of 
Terrorist 
Activity 
Presence of 
Minoritiese: 
-
Deputy
Governor 
For 
Terrorism· 
Terrorism 
Reported 
No 
. 
Terrorism 
Reported 
Low Medium High 
-
14% 
0 %  
86% 
(n=7) 
+ 
20 % 
• 
�20% 
0 %  • 
80 % 
(n::;: 5) 
-
22% 
6 %  
72% 
(n=18) 
+· 
55% . 
�64% 
9% 
• 
3 6 %  
(n=2 2) 
-
29%  
14 % 
57% 
(n=7) 
+ 
60%  .. 
1190 % 
30 � 0 .. 
10 % 
(n= lO) 
t.n ..... 
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reported in the Bangkok and United States press at the time he 
was writing ( then with the RAND Corporation),e3 3  and instead turn 
to a trivial discussion of personal maladjustment--a not uncom­
mon phenomenon anywhere. 
There is no denying certain signs of social, economic 
and political discontent among rural folk which can 
be interpreted as symptoms of a latent political con­
sciousness. The symbolism of the wrist watches in the 
possession of farmers who have no need to know the 
time of day, fountain pens in the pockets of the semi­
literate, freshly starched white broadcloth shirts,
glittering leather shoes and permanent waves all sug­
gest some questing for more on the part of the peasan­
try which is touched by them. At present whatever 
malaise this questing represents is only a potential 
political force. No one has yet found the touchstone 
to realize it. (1962 : 7) 
The Thai Government ' s  response to this activity is of in­
terest. Failing to realize that this activity occurs in areas 
where developmental progress has been made, it stresses--as does 
the United States government and its AID mission--the poverty 
of the areas and sets out to aid them in their "plight" :e3 ,.. 
33. See for example the New York Times of May 11e, 1961; Decem­
ber 1 5, 1961; January 8, 1961; May 24, 1962; and, for exam­
ple, the Bangkok Pos t  of January 18 and 27, 1960; February
27, 1960; April 2, 1960; May 4, 1960; June 11, 1960; July
3, 1960; October 9, 1960. In addition, the New York Times 
of December 17, 1964, reports that periodic mass arrests 
over the previous s ix years had been carried out to counter 
"subversion." The ignoring of these reports paralleled the 
attitudes of the Thai and U. S. governments and armed forces. 
As Peter Braestrup reports : "Some Thai leaders sounded re­
peated alarms over the Communist menace, particularly after 
the Inda-China war. But the threat seen by Thai Army plan­
ners and diplomats was a Big Red Arrow coming from China or 
Hanoi through Laos, not a domestic insurgency.e" ( 1967 :  60)
In addition, he reports : "Pre-occupied with Vietnam, \Vash­
ington long dismissed reports of Northeast trouble as 'ban­
di try . ' " ( 19 6 7 : 62 ) 
3 4. The same approach is taken by such academic studies as 
Thailand:  New Chal lenges and the  Strugg le  for a Po li tical  
and Eaonomia "Take- Off'' (particularly chapter 3, "Internal 
Vulnerabilities"), published by the American-Asian Educa­
tional Exchange in cooperation with the National Strategy
Information Center, Inc., by Professor Frank C. Darling, 
now of DePauw University and formerly a research analyst 
on Thailand for the Central Intelligence Agency. 
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Recent developments in Southeast Asia have increased 
the threat to Thai security from Communis� led subver­
sione. In northeast Thailand, the country ' s  poorest 
region, Communist infiltreation and subversion have 
already begune. To meet this challenge quickly and 
effectively requires an ac.celerated program of eco­
nomic and social development as well as improvement
in the Thai security forcese. The Thai Government has 
undertaken a far-reaching program designed to reduce 
these vulnerabilities of the northeast, and our mili­
tary and economic assistance programs are aimed at 
assisting the Thai Government in this essential secur­
ity effort . (U. S. Department of St ate , 19 6 7 : 4) 
Indeed, the basic assumption underlying this policy is explicit, 
for Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara himself once asserted 
that there is an irrefutable relationship between violence and 
economic backwardness" (1966). This study would not call for 
such a simplistic and static view of "world poverty" but rather 
for an examination of those "poor" areas in which one finds out­
breaks of violence and would furthermore point towards those 
"poor" areas which have made some limited progress. As Trotsky 
pointed out: 
In reality, the mere existence of privations is not 
enough to cause an insurerection ; if it were, the 
masses would always be in revolt. (Cited in Brinton, 
1965:  33) 
Our findings appear to parallel--on the sub-national level 
--those of Brinton who has studied the preconditions and dynamics
of revolutions on a national levele. He states, discussing mainly 
the revolutions of England, America, France and Russia, that: 
Revolutions did not occur in societies with declining
economies • . •  · . Har .dly any non-Marxist historian 
nowadays questions the fact that Russia of the first 
three Dumas (190 6-12) was on its way upward as a 
Western society. In comparison with the West, Russia 
was "backward" ine. 1917, but it was progressing rapidly 
toward economic maturity. 
Our revolutions, then, clearly were not born in socie­
ties economically retrograde ; on the contrary, they
took place in societies economically progressivee. 
This does not, of course, mean that no groups within 
these societies cherished grievances mainly economic 
in character. (Brinton, 1965: 29, 31-32 )  
Moreover, his analysis points toward factors that might be in­
vestigated with regard to insurrection at a regional level. 
Brinton also maintains that : 
5 4  
Two main foci for economic motives of discontent seem 
to stand out .  First, and much less important, is the 
actual misery of  certain groups in a given society . .  • • 
Of much greater importance is the existence among a 
group, or groups, of a feel ing that prevail ing condi­
tions l imit or hinder their economic activity . . . e. 
Thus we can see that certain economic grievances-­
usually not in the form of  economic distress, but 
rather a feel ing op the part of some of  the chief 
enterprising groups that their opportunities for get­
ting on in this world are unduly l imited by pol itical · 
arrangements--would seem to be one of the symptoms of 
revolut ion. (196 5 :  3 2-34) 
Thus, the very common discussion of the very l ow per capita in­
come in areas of Thailand3 5  may well be irrelevant, for the per­
ceptions of those considered to be "poor"· are all-important in 
assessing l iving levels.  Brinton states, "What satisfied an 
Engl ish peasant in 1 640 would be misery and want for an Engl ish 
farm laborer in 1965," and that what provokes a group to attack 
a government is not simply deprivat ion or misery, but "an in­
tolerable gap between what people want and what they get"
(Brinton, 196 5 :  29- 3 0 ) .  
One can conclude from the findings of this study that un­
less the Thai national system "opens up" to absorb the expansion 
of areas that have begun to differentiate structurally and to 
permit  their access to the channels of information, power and 
resources of  the national system, economic development will 
only stimulate more areas to resist the structural relat ionships 
that res train them in positions that have become incommensura·te 
with their new levels of  structural development. It appears,· 
however, that the present Thai government, and many U.eS. govern­
ment officials, are turning instead towards maintaining Bangkok's 
firm control of the nation in the face of increasing provincial 
unrest. Neuchterlein, one time civil ian officer in the U . S. 
Department of Defense, seems to agree with this Thai government 
pol icy and fails to see the possibil ity that what is happening 
in Thailand is indeed not so much a call for a democratic 
government, but rather, a demand for more provincial autonomye. 
If "authoritarian rule" is actually one of the underlying fac­
tors in provincial unrest, then to uphold and increase Bangkok's
control of the nation can only have the opposite effect to that 
desired . Neuchterlein states : 
[ Some] Thai leaders, notably Foreign Minister Thanat 
Khoman . . e. bel ieve that a mild form of  authoritarian 
35. See, for example, the discussion by Long (1966) about the 
relatively low per capita income in the Northeast. 
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rule is consistent with Thai psychology and tradition 
and is the best form of government while the nation is 
undergoing an economic and social revolution and also 
facing Communist insurgency . . e• .  
. . . Among university students, young army officers 
and young civil servants--traditional sources of polit­
ical unrest in Thailand--there is little evidence of 
serious dissatisfaction with the present government .e . • • 
. . • The success of the Thanom regime in gaining
general acceptance from the politically-aware elements 
of the population does not apply equally to the rural 
areas of the nation, particularly in the Northeas.t 
where Communist penetration has been the greateste. 
The government has sought to overcome this deficiency
by channeling a larger proportion of natural resources 
to this area and through better selection and training
of government officials sent there. ( 1967: 1 2 6-1 2 7). 
Is the dissatisfaction in the Northeast and elsewhere really 
a result of these areas having officials who lack sufficient 
training, or a result of the officials sent there being more 
responsive to Bangkok ' s, rather than local, interests? One 
government officer who had the "unorthodox thesis that a mili­
tary approach to Hanoi-backed dissidence in the Northeast would 
create more problems than it solved" was replaced as head of 
the pacification effort in the Northeast (New York Times , Octo­
ber 8, 1967: 1 4) .  As Peter Braestrup states: 
His approach to counterinsurgency was unorthodoxe. He 
toured the Northeast telling local officials that their 
j ob was not merely "suppression" but also protecting 
the villages, listening to the people, helping them, 
secur.ing theire_econfidence . 
. • . In the paternalistic Thai context, these were 
avant-garde sentiments, and many of Saiyud ' s  army and 
police colleagues, especially in Bangkok, found them 
incomprehensible. To a good many Thai officials the.
notion that villagers should be "listened to" still 
seems almost embarrassingly undignifiede. (1967: 66)3 6  
3 6 .  It is of interest to note that a New York Times report
fr_om the Northeast describes how unpopular the replacement
of General Saiyud was, and that six out of the seven pro­
vincial governors most affected boycotted several army
ceremonies to indicate their displeasure (October 20, 1967: 
11). General Saiyud was later assigned.eto head the 
Communist Suppression departmente. 
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This analysis of the sources of socio-political unrest is sup­
ported by that of Edward Harmon, the USAID advisor in Nakhon 
Phanom who wrote of a "model vil lage" that "went Communist.e" 
Harmon concluded that : 
" It ' s  quite possible to improve [the vil lager's] eco­
nomic status and furnish him with the best services 
while his loyalty to the Government is actual ly re­
duced because of lack of understanding or considera­
tion by its employees.e" (Quoted in Braestrup, 1967e: 
6 2 ) 3 7 
Thus the United States and Thailand through AID missions 
and development programs may be laying the groundwork for even 
3 8greater insurrectionist activity ! To stimulate a region eco­
nomical ly and then to restrain it in a subordinate position in 
the national system is to invite structural tension and eventual 
social conflict. There is a paral lel between this and studies 
that have established that it is those Blacks who are beginning
to progress within American society, and then finding barriers 
to further advance, who are most likely to riot. 
In relation to the thesis that social conflict is the re­
sult of a rigid system placing barriers in the way of fast-grow­
ing subsystems, it is of interest to notee--on an individual 
level--the fate of those Northeastern politicians who have 
worked to lessen Bangkok's predominance in the national system.
"Between 1949 and 195 2, at least five of the leading personali­
ties of the group [of Northeastern politicians] were assassie-
37. Braestrup goes on to discuss a USAID mission report : 
"Just as important [as sufficient manpower, equipment
and budgetary support ] ,  the report said, was the need 
for a radical mental readjustment on the part of Thai 
bureaucracy toward its relations with the people it 
administers. . e. .  
"The vil lager wants a dialogue between himself and his 
officials on an egalitarian basis that aims at elimi­
nating corruption, modification of regulations and 
adjudication of differences . . . .  We should more 
carefu l ly consider what the villager himself wants . 
• . • " (1967 :  74) 
38. It has been argued that rural improvement programs may
actual l y  increase the effectiveness of guerril la operations 
by providing an enhanced resource base yet offering no in­
centive to greater popular support of the government 
(Charles Wolf in Bel l, 1969:  53)e. 
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na t e d "e3 _9 (Wi1 son , 196 6 : 35 0) . Moreover , there is de ta i1e d do cu -
mentation relating to political harassment and detention of 
Northeasterners who attempted to make an impact and changes on 
the national sceneeq 0 (Keyes, 1967a). Also on the individual 
level, with particular regard to the Northeast, the dynamics of 
social mobility has been examined : 
Will  the economic solutions proposed for the North­
east's problems be effective? It seems to me that 
the maj or problem facing the Northeast is one of polit­
ical commitment, and it is at least problematical 
whether such political problems can .ebe solved by eco­
nomic means. . . e• I w6uld suggest that far from solv­
ing the problem of the Northeast, such measures are 
likely to aggravate the specifically pol itical dimen­
sions of the problem .· By raising villagerse' income 
levels within the traditional economic framework, by
making life easier and more comfortable for the rural 
villager, the levels of aspirations among young men 
are also likely to rise and the means of achieving
such aspirations--e. g. , freedom from poverty, better 
educational facilities--will· be avai·lable .· ·e· Thus, more 
young men are likely to want to achieve social status 
outside of the rural village and outside of the peasant 
style of life. But most plans for development of the 
Northeast do not seem to take into account the possi­
bility of such an increase in aspiration . . e. .  Unless 
efforts are made to keep channels of mobility open,
and to expand them, we are likely to find a crucial 
segment of the Northeastern populeation thwarted in 
their aspirationse- -perhaps an easy prey to those who 
might offer alternative commitments and alternative 
opportunities for status achievement . ( Kirsch, 1966 : 
370, 377 -78) 
39. These assassinations might be viewed in the same light as 
the murders in the American South of "uppity" Negroes, 
such as Civil Rights workers, for .erepression, rather than 
accommodation, is the likely response to anyone who seeks 
to change a highly rigid societye. 
40e. That this harassment continued and that there was a movement 
from legitimate political channels to guerrilla-type polit­
ical opposition is indicated by the following quotation 
from the U. S. Army Handbook  for Thai land : "Thai security
forces, in raids during 'May, June and December, 1961, re­
portedly seized caches of arms and ammunition, as wel l as 
some 350 Communist agents and suspectse. Included in this 
group was a former member of the Thai National Assembly, 
who was summarily executed" (1963: 384). 
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That there is an increasing number of Thai--and not only in 
the Northeast- -who are "falling prey" seems to be indicated by
the report that the Communist Operations Suppression Office put
the terrorist strength at a record high figure of 3,000 men in 
the Northeast and 1,000 in the South (New York Times , November 
19, 1968), while 275 guerrillas were reported killed and 2,788 
captured between 1965 and 1967 (New York Times  , December 16, 
1967e: 83). Moreover, these former figures do not seem to include 
terrorist activity in the other regions of Thailand. For exam­
ple, Newsweek  , after describing in detail a major clash between 
terrorists and Thai security forces near the village of Thap 
Berk in the northern region of Thailand, states that, "Until last 
November this kind of sustained fighting was unknown in northern 
Thailand" (January 20, 1969: 46). 
Some sources believe there has been a recent decline in 
terrorist activity and that this fact has been suppressed by the 
Thai government so as to maintain the flow of American assist­
ance, particularly counterinsurgency and military aide. If this 
is a real and permanent decrease and not j ust a decrease in the 
reporting of such activity, then it might be explained by showing 
that those areas that we.re making a "push" had now attracted the 
attention of the center, that is, of Bangkok, and in so doing,
they have structurally reorganized the national system for now 
Bangkok must take note of these areas and deal with them in a 
serious manner. However, such a lull is still to be verified. 
One danger of a government being supported by foreign military 
aid is that it can afford to become less  responsive to domestic 
pressures and claims. That the political and terrorist activity
occurring in various provinces throughout Thailand has been re­
garded more as "Hanoi- and Peking-backed" insurgency rather than 
in terms of indigenous, structurally-produced social and politi­
cal conflict is something that is difficult to understand, as 
is Wyatt's uncertainty and conclusion in the face of an increase 
in conflict through the early sixties : 
Lacking a parliamentary forum, which the Northeast 
used to some (aural, if not practical) effect some 
years ago, it is difficult to foresee the form in 
which future protest might be expressed. Might the 
old forms [local rebellions] be transmuted into new,
and political violence with an ideological tone take 
the place of local protest with a semi-magical bent? 
One would expect not, for the essence of . . e. the 
old protest was change within the framework of the 
existing system. (1966:  3 54) 
It is interesting to relate this to the studies of Thailand's 
social order, one of the best discussions of which is in an 
article by Lucien Hanks . While acknowledging that selected 
people have been able to rise through the social strate of Thai 
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society , he stresses that nevertheless the social stations are 
fixed in much the same way as the rigid hierarchy of ranks in 
the army (1962: 1 248). He then goes on to point out that : 
The coherence of Thai society rests largely on the 
value of becoming a client of someone who has greater 
resources than one alone possesses ; a person is ill­
advised to try to fight one ' s  own battles independently 
. . •  the [feudal ]  relation endures only as long as it 
serves the convenience of both parties . . e. .  A Thai 
freeman formerly sought out the advantages of rendering 
services, for the benefits increased his security. In 
contrast, the bottom ranks of feudal society, except­
ing the outlaws, were by and large the most tightly 
bound and least mobile. (1962: 1 249-50) 
Might not such a social pattern be a reflection of the structural 
arrangement of a rigid society? Indeed , could not these outlaws 
be people who were unprepared to accept the rigid system imposed 
from above? That a person ' s  opposition to the existing arrange­
ment of affairs and ranks would not be acceptable to tho·se who 
were in the dominant position need hardly be stressed, and the 
parallels to the provinces which are seeking to reorganize the 
system- -perhaps to lessen Bangkok ' s  dominance--need not be 
pointed out. With regard to the traditional Thai social order, 
Hanks goes on to point out that: 
To be sure, freedom to make and break· liaisons to a 
superior was not always equally or immediately avail­
ab le . . e• .  Of course, freedom to contract anew did 
not obviate the use of force to sustain a liaison, and 
many a military expedition set out to punish a vassal 
who delayed in forwarding tribute. (1962: 1 2 51) 
Whether it is possibele to equate the Thai security forces with 
such military expeditions is a question that wil l  only be raised 
here. The main point to be made is that while the Thai social 
system has alleowed for social mobility, this has general ly been 
allowed to those who did not challenge the existing order. 
However, the assertiveness of the political ly, economically, and 
socially self-conscious Northeasterners in the political sphere
threatened a de facto rearrangement of the existing order ; hence 
their activities could not be toleratede. In the same way, the 
"mobility" of provinces necessarily reduces their traditional 
subordination and challenges the existing sttuctural arrange­
ments and patterns. 
In conclusion, we think it important to point. out that 
structural analysis of the type undertaken in this paper opens 
new fields of inquiry: no longer do studies of economic devel­
opment have to be hindered by the lack of conventional data and 
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by the unreliability of aggregative census-type data. Finally, 
we urge that stress be given to an analysis of national economic,
social, political, development over time so that the actual 
dynamics of change--only hinted at in this paper--might be under­
stood more fully. 
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